CVE-2024-36495
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe application Faronics WINSelect (Standard + Enterprise) saves its configuration in an encrypted file on the file system which "Everyone" has read and write access to, path to file: C:\ProgramData\WINSelect\WINSelect.wsd The path for the affected WINSelect Enterprise configuration file is: C:\ProgramData\Faronics\StorageSpace\WS\WINSelect.wsd
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceFaronics WINSelect (Standard + Enterprise) stores encrypted configuration files at C:\ProgramData\WINSelect\WINSelect.wsd and C:\ProgramData\Faronics\StorageSpace\WS\WINSelect.wsd. These files are stored in locations where the 'Everyone' group has read and write permissions, allowing any local user to access and potentially decrypt the configuration data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if WINSelect is installedLook for WINSelect installation at C:\ProgramData\WINSelect\ or check registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Faronics\WINSelect for installation evidenceAffected if WINSelect is present on the system
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Locate WINSelect configuration filesVerify the presence of WINSelect.wsd at C:\ProgramData\WINSelect\WINSelect.wsd and C:\ProgramData\Faronics\StorageSpace\WS\WINSelect.wsdAffected if One or both configuration files exist
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Inspect NTFS permissions on the configuration filesRight-click each WINSelect.wsd file, go to Properties > Security, and examine the 'Group or user names' list to see if 'Everyone' is listed with any permissionsAffected if The 'Everyone' group is explicitly listed in the security permissions for either config file
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Inspect NTFS permissions on the parent directoriesCheck security permissions on C:\ProgramData\WINSelect\ and C:\ProgramData\Faronics\StorageSpace\WS\ directories for 'Everyone' group accessAffected if The 'Everyone' group has read or write permissions on either parent directory containing the config files
A system is affected if WINSelect is installed and either the configuration files or their parent directories grant the 'Everyone' group read or write permissions, allowing any local user to access potentially sensitive configuration data.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict NTFS permissions on the WINSelect configuration files and parent directories to remove 'Everyone' access, limiting read/write to Administrators and the WINSelect service account only. Verify the encryption mechanism does not rely on hardcoded or derivable keys.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-36495 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-36495 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data