CVE-2024-36555
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBuilt-in SMS-configuration command in Forever KidsWatch Call Me KW50 R36_YDR_A3PW_GM7S_V1.0_2019_07_15_16.19.24_cob_h and Forever KidsWatch Call Me 2 KW-60 R36CW_YDE_S4_A29_2_V1.0_2023.05.24_22.49.44_cob_b allows malicious users to change the device IMEI-number which allows for forging the identity of the device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA built-in SMS-configuration command in Forever KidsWatch Call Me KW50 and KW-60 devices allows unauthenticated users to change the device IMEI number via SMS, enabling device identity forgery.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelLocate the device label or settings menu to confirm the exact model is Forever KidsWatch Call Me KW50 or KW-60Affected if Device is a KW50 or KW-60 model
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Verify SMS configuration is activeCheck device settings or documentation to determine if the SMS-based configuration feature is enabled on the deviceAffected if SMS configuration feature is enabled and reachable
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Test IMEI command accessSend the built-in SMS configuration command for IMEI modification (consult device documentation for the specific command syntax) from an unauthorized numberAffected if The command executes and changes the IMEI without requiring authentication
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Check for authentication requirementReview device SMS command documentation or attempt the IMEI change command with incorrect credentials if authentication is expectedAffected if IMEI can be changed via SMS without any password, PIN, or other authentication
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Confirm network exposureDetermine if the device SMS receiver is accessible from external/untrusted phone numbersAffected if The device accepts SMS commands from numbers not pre-registered or trusted
If the device is a KW50 or KW-60 model with SMS configuration enabled and the IMEI can be changed via SMS without any authentication, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataContact the device vendor for a firmware update that requires authentication for IMEI modification commands, or disable SMS-based configuration if possible.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,928.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-36555 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-36555 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data