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Npcm750r FirmwareOperating system · Nuvoton

CVE-2024-38433

MEDIUM · 6.7 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-07-11
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 10.10.19 or later.
See remediation →
69/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Nuvoton - CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness An attacker with write access to the SPI-Flash on an NPCM7xx BMC subsystem that uses the Nuvoton BootBlock reference code can modify the u-boot image header on flash parsed by the BootBlock which could lead to arbitrary code execution.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

The Nuvoton BootBlock reference code for NPCM7xx BMC subsystems fails to properly validate the u-boot image header stored in SPI-Flash. An attacker with physical write access to the SPI-Flash can modify the u-boot header, which BootBlock parses without sufficient authentication checks, enabling arbitrary code execution during the boot process.

MitigationRestrict physical access to the BMC SPI-Flash and implement cryptographic verification of the u-boot image header in the BootBlock to prevent execution of tampered images.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Npcm750r FirmwareOperating system
Affected:< 10.10.19
Npcm710r FirmwareOperating system
Affected:< 10.10.19
Npcm730r FirmwareOperating system
Affected:< 10.10.19
Npcm705r FirmwareOperating system
Affected:< 10.10.19

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the BMC chip model
    Check the BMC hardware or system documentation for the Nuvoton NPCM7xx chip variant (Npcm750r, Npcm710r, Npcm730r, or Npcm705r). On Linux BMC, run: `ipmitool mc info` or check /dev/mtd device names for NPCM7xx references.
    Affected if The system uses an Nuvoton Npcm750r, Npcm710r, Npcm730r, or Npcm705r BMC chip.
  2. Check the installed firmware version
    Retrieve the BMC firmware version via IPMI: `ipmitool mc info` or via the BMC web interface under firmware/hardware info. Compare the version string to the vulnerable threshold.
    Affected if The firmware version is earlier than 10.10.19 for any of the affected Npcm750r, Npcm710r, Npcm730r, or Npcm705r variants.
  3. Determine if signature verification is enabled in BootBlock
    Access the BootBlock configuration or flash layout. On the BMC, inspect the u-boot image header in the SPI-Flash partition (often /dev/mtd0 or /dev/mtd1). Look for signature or hash verification flags in the BootBlock config, typically accessible via `strings` on the BootBlock binary or through BMC debug interfaces.
    Affected if The BootBlock lacks cryptographic verification of the u-boot image header and the firmware is below version 10.10.19.
  4. Verify SPI-Flash physical security
    Physically inspect the BMC board to determine if the SPI-Flash chip is accessible or if there are write-protect mechanisms. Check if the flash is in a socket versus soldered, and whether tamper-evident seals are in place.
    Affected if Physical access to write to the SPI-Flash is possible without detection.

You are affected if your BMC runs on an Npcm750r, Npcm710r, Npcm730r, or Npcm705r chip with firmware version below 10.10.19 and the BootBlock does not verify cryptographic signatures on the u-boot image header.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 10.10.19 or later
Fixed in 10.10.19
Interim mitigation

Restrict physical access to the BMC SPI-Flash and implement cryptographic verification of the u-boot image header in the BootBlock to prevent execution of tampered images.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

Firmware version 10.10.19 for NPCM750r/NPCM710r/NPCM730r/NPCM705r

  1. Identify the exact NPCM7xx BMC model (NPCM750r, NPCM710r, NPCM730r, or NPCM705r) in your system
  2. Obtain the official Nuvoton firmware version 10.10.19 or later from the vendor
  3. Follow the vendor's standard BMC firmware update procedure, typically involving: a) Upload the firmware image via BMC web interface, IPMI, or USB, b) Initiate the firmware update process, c) Allow the BMC to reboot and apply the new firmware
  4. Verify the firmware version has been successfully updated to 10.10.19 or later after reboot
  5. Ensure the SPI-Flash is not writeable by unauthorized parties; restrict physical and administrative access to the BMC

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Npcm750r Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation20.0 h
  • Testing16.0 h
  • Review / QA8.0 h
50.0 hours of engineering $8,640
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-38433 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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