CVE-2024-39033
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn Newgensoft OmniDocs 11.0_SP1_03_006, Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the getuserproperty function allows user's configuration and PII to be stolen.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceIDOR vulnerability in the getuserproperty function of Newgensoft OmniDocs 11.0_SP1_03_006 allows authenticated users to access other users' configuration data and PII by manipulating object references without proper authorization validation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Verify OmniDocs versionAccess the application admin panel or check the installation directory for version information. Look for a version file or about page that displays the exact build version (e.g., 11.0_SP1_03_006).Affected if The installed version matches 11.0_SP1_03_006 exactly, or falls within the 11.0 SP1 build range prior to the fix.
-
Confirm getuserproperty function is exposedLocate the web service endpoint or API path for getuserproperty. This is typically found in the application's URL structure, such as /omniDocs/getuserproperty or similar REST/soap endpoint. Use the browser developer tools or a web proxy to identify if this function is accessible.Affected if The getuserproperty endpoint returns a response (even an error) indicating it is reachable and enabled.
-
Verify user authentication is activeLog into OmniDocs with any valid user account. Confirm the session is established by checking for a session token or authentication cookie. Ensure you have a regular user account (non-admin) to test the IDOR condition.Affected if You can successfully authenticate as a standard user and receive a valid session token.
-
Test IDOR by manipulating object referencesWith an authenticated session, make a request to getuserproperty while modifying the user identifier parameter (such as userId, user_id, or object reference) to point to a different user's ID. Capture the request using a web proxy and observe if the response contains that other user's configuration data or PII.Affected if The application returns data belonging to a different user than the authenticated requester, confirming the IDOR vulnerability is present.
You are affected if OmniDocs 11.0_SP1_03_006 is installed, the getuserproperty endpoint is accessible, and manipulating user identifiers in authenticated requests returns other users' data without authorization checks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement authorization checks in getuserproperty to verify the requesting user has permission to access the requested user data, and validate user identity before returning any user-specific information.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-39033 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-39033 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data