CVE-2024-39345
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAdTran 834-5 HDC17600021F1 (SmartOS 11.1.1.1) devices enable the SSH service by default and have a hidden, undocumented, hard-coded support account whose password is based on the devices MAC address. All of the devices internet interfaces share a similar MAC address that only varies in their final octet. This allows network-adjacent attackers to derive the support user's SSH password by decrementing the final octet of the connected gateway address or via the BSSID. An attacker can then execute arbitrary OS commands with root-level privileges. NOTE: The vendor states that there is no intended functionality allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary OS Commands with root-level privileges. The vendor also states that this issue was fixed in SmartOS 12.5.5.1.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAdTran 834-5 devices running SmartOS 11.1.1.1 have a hidden hard-coded support account with SSH access enabled by default. The account password is derived from the device's MAC address following a predictable pattern where devices share similar MAC addresses differing only in the final octet. Attackers with network adjacency can derive the password by decrementing the final octet of the gateway address or via BSSID, then SSH in with root privileges to execute arbitrary OS commands.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 12.1.3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify SmartOS versionAccess the device admin interface or CLI and determine the installed SmartOS version. Compare it to the affected range: versions prior to 12.1.3.1 are vulnerable.Affected if The device runs SmartOS version lower than 12.1.3.1
-
Verify SSH service statusCheck the device configuration to confirm whether SSH service is enabled. The CVE states SSH access is enabled by default on affected devices.Affected if SSH service is enabled on the device
-
Identify the hidden support accountExamine the system account list or attempt authentication using the support account credentials. The CVE describes a hidden hard-coded support account with root privileges.Affected if The hidden support account exists on the system with root-level access
The environment is affected if it runs AdTran SmartOS version below 12.1.3.1 with SSH service enabled, as the hard-coded support account would be present and accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped12.1.3.1
Upgrade to SmartOS 12.5.5.1 or later to remediate. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, disable SSH service if unnecessary, implement network segmentation to limit exposure, and monitor for unauthorized access using the hard-coded credentials.
SmartOS 12.5.5.1
- 1. Identify the current SmartOS version running on the AdTran 834-5 device by accessing the device management interface or running 'version' command via CLI.
- 2. Confirm the device is running a version earlier than 12.5.5.1 (the vendor-stated fixed release).
- 3. Schedule a maintenance window for the upgrade, as this is a firmware/OS update that will require a device restart.
- 4. Obtain the SmartOS 12.5.5.1 firmware image from the official AdTran support portal or vendor-authorized distribution channel.
- 5. Upload the 12.5.5.1 firmware image to the device through the standard firmware upgrade procedure (typically via web UI or CLI 'upgrade' command).
- 6. Allow the device to complete the upgrade process and reboot automatically.
- 7. After reboot, verify the new version is 12.5.5.1 by checking 'version' in CLI.
- 8. Validate that the hidden support account vulnerability is resolved by confirming the undocumented account no longer exists or has been changed.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-39345 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-39345 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data