CVE-2024-40636
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSteeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build production-grade cloud-native applications using externalized configuration, service discovery, distributed tracing, application management, and more. When utilizing multiple Eureka server service URLs with basic auth and encountering an issue with fetching the service registry, an error is logged with the Eureka server service URLs but only the first URL is masked. The code in question is `_logger.LogError(e, "FetchRegistry Failed for Eureka service urls: {EurekaServerServiceUrls}", new Uri(ClientConfig.EurekaServerServiceUrls).ToMaskedString());` in the `DiscoveryClient.cs` file which may leak credentials into logs. This issue has been addressed in version 3.2.8 of the Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka nuget package.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceWhen the Steeltoe Discovery Client logs errors while fetching the Eureka service registry with multiple Eureka server URLs configured with basic authentication, only the first URL gets masked by ToMaskedString(), leaving subsequent URLs with exposed credentials (username:password) in application logs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka package versionInspect the project file (.csproj) or list installed NuGet packages to find the version of Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka. Look for a line like <PackageReference Include="Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka" Version="x.x.x" /> or use 'dotnet list package'Affected if The installed version is lower than 3.2.8 (e.g., 3.2.7, 3.2.0, 2.x, etc.)
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Verify multiple Eureka server URLs are configuredCheck application configuration files (appsettings.json, appsettings.{environment}.json, or YAML) for the 'eureka:client:serverList' or 'eureka:serverList' configuration section. Also check any environment-specific overrides.Affected if Two or more Eureka server URLs are listed in the configuration
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Confirm basic authentication is enabled for EurekaInspect the same configuration files for 'eureka:client:username' and 'eureka:client:password' or equivalent basic auth settings under the Eureka server configuration section.Affected if Username and password credentials are configured for Eureka server authentication
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Review application logs for credential exposureSearch existing application logs (file-based, console, or centralized logging) for entries containing Eureka server URLs. Look for error-level logs during service registry fetches.Affected if Logs contain URLs with visible username:password patterns (e.g., http://user:pass@server2:8761/eureka/) instead of masked credentials
You are affected if you use Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka version lower than 3.2.8 with multiple Eureka server URLs configured and basic authentication enabled, and any error logs may contain exposed credentials for URLs beyond the first one.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade the Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka nuget package to version 3.2.8 or later which properly masks all Eureka server URLs in log output.
Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka version 3.2.8
- Update the Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka NuGet package reference in your project file (.csproj) to version 3.2.8 or later
- Run `dotnet restore` to fetch the updated package
- Rebuild and redeploy your application
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-40636 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-40636 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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