CVE-2024-41664
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCanarytokens help track activity and actions on a network. Prior to `sha-8ea5315`, Canarytokens.org was vulnerable to a blind SSRF in the Webhook alert feature. When a Canarytoken is created, users choose to receive alerts either via email or via a webhook. If a webhook is supplied when a Canarytoken is first created, the site will make a test request to the supplied URL to ensure it accepts alert notification HTTP requests. No safety checks were performed on the URL, leading to a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability. The SSRF is Blind because the content of the response is not displayed to the creating user; they are simply told whether an error occurred in making the test request. Using the Blind SSRF, it was possible to map out open ports for IPs inside the Canarytokens.org infrastructure. This issue is now patched on Canarytokens.org. Users of self-hosted Canarytokens installations can update by pulling the latest Docker image, or any Docker image after `sha-097d91a`.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCanarytokens.org had a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its webhook alert feature. When users created a Canarytoken with a webhook URL, the system made a test request to validate the webhook without performing any safety checks on the URL. This allowed attackers to supply internal URLs or private network IPs, enabling port scanning and internal infrastructure mapping. The vulnerability is 'blind' because only HTTP error status was returned to the user, not the response content.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify deployment typeDetermine if you are using the self-hosted Canarytokens Docker deployment or the managed canarytokens.org service. Self-hosted deployments will have your own Docker infrastructure and configuration files.Affected if Only self-hosted deployments are affected; managed canarytokens.org users are protected by the vendor patch.
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Check Docker image version for self-hostedRun 'docker images' or inspect your docker-compose file to identify the Canarytokens image SHA or tag. Compare against the patched version sha-097d91a.Affected if Using a self-hosted image with SHA older than sha-097d91a means the vulnerability is present.
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Verify webhook configuration existsReview your Canarytokens configuration files (typically config.py or environment variables) for any webhook URL settings, or check the database for created tokens with webhook alert URLs configured.Affected if Webhooks must be enabled and at least one token configured with a webhook URL for the SSRF to be exploitable.
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Audit logs for internal network accessSearch server access and error logs for HTTP requests to private IP ranges (10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x), localhost (127.0.0.1), or internal hostnames that originate from the webhook validation endpoint.Affected if Log evidence of requests to internal/private network addresses from the webhook feature indicates exploitation.
You are affected if you run a self-hosted Canarytokens deployment with a Docker image version prior to sha-097d91a and have the webhook alert feature enabled with configured webhook URLs.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to the patched Docker image (sha-097d91a or later for self-hosted deployments). For canarytokens.org users, no action is required as the vendor has already applied the patch. Review server logs for signs of exploitation targeting internal infrastructure.
Docker image after sha-097d91a (or latest)
- Pull the latest Docker image for Canarytokens using: docker pull canarytokens/canarytokens:latest
- Alternatively, pull a Docker image after commit sha-097d91a
- Stop the existing Canarytokens container
- Start the container with the new image
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-41664 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-41664 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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