CVE-2024-42041
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe com.videodownload.browser.videodownloader (aka AppTool-Browser-Video All Video Downloader) application 20-30.05.24 for Android allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code via the acr.browser.lightning.DefaultBrowserActivity component.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Android application 'AppTool-Browser-Video All Video Downloader' contains a JavaScript injection vulnerability in the acr.browser.lightning.DefaultBrowserActivity component. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript code, likely due to improper sanitization of user-supplied input or URLs being passed to a WebView without appropriate security controls.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the app is installedCheck device for 'AppTool-Browser-Video All Video Downloader' or 'All Video Downloader' in installed applications via Settings > Apps or using adb: adb shell pm list packages | grep -i 'video.*downloader' or 'acr.browser'Affected if The application package is present on the device
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Determine the installed versionRun: adb shell dumpsys package <package_name> | grep versionName, or check the app info screen in Settings > Apps > [App Name] > App infoAffected if Version cannot be determined or falls within vulnerable version ranges (compare your version to known affected releases)
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Identify the vulnerable componentDecompile the APK and inspect AndroidManifest.xml for the DefaultBrowserActivity component, or use aapt: aapt dump badging <apk_file> | grep 'activity'Affected if The acr.browser.lightning.DefaultBrowserActivity is exported and accessible
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Check if WebView has JavaScript enabledInspect the app's WebView settings in the source code (look for WebSettings setJavaScriptEnabled(true)), or analyze network traffic when the app processes external URLsAffected if JavaScript execution is enabled in the WebView configuration (WebSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true) without proper allow-listing)
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Verify intent handling for external URLsReview AndroidManifest.xml for intent filters on DefaultBrowserActivity, or test by sending a crafted intent: adb shell am start -n <package>/acr.browser.lightning.DefaultBrowserActivity -d 'javascript:alert(1)'Affected if The activity accepts arbitrary URLs or JavaScript URIs from external intents without validation
The user is affected if the app is installed, uses a vulnerable version with JavaScript enabled in WebView, and the DefaultBrowserActivity accepts unvalidated external input that can be interpreted as JavaScript.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable JavaScript execution in the WebView unless explicitly required, implement proper input validation and URL allow-listing, and use WebSettings to restrict JavaScript access to only trusted origins.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-42041 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-42041 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data