CVE-2024-42190
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook (HTMO) is susceptible to a DLL hijacking vulnerability which could allow an attacker to modify or replace the application with malicious content.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceHCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook (HTMO) contains a DLL hijacking vulnerability where the application loads dynamic link libraries from insecure paths. An attacker with local or remote access could place a malicious DLL in a location where the application searches for libraries, causing the application to execute the malicious code with the same privileges as the application.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 3.0.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm HCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook is installedCheck the installed programs list in Windows Control Panel or use 'Get-ItemProperty' in PowerShell for registry keys under HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall for entries containing 'HCL Traveler' or 'HTMO'Affected if The product is listed as installed
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Identify installed versionLocate the application executable or check version information: right-click the HTMO executable, select Properties, then Details, or use PowerShell to query the version from the main binaryAffected if The displayed version is lower than 3.0.12 (for example, 3.0.11, 3.0.10, etc.)
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Locate application installation directoryFind the path where HTMO is installed (commonly under C:\Program Files\HCL\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\HCL\), which contains the main executable and associated DLL filesAffected if The application directory exists and contains executable and DLL files
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Enumerate DLL files in application pathList all .dll files in the HTMO installation directory and any subdirectories, noting any files that appear unexpected or unsignedAffected if There are unsigned, unknown, or recently added DLL files present in the application load path
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Check file system permissions on application directoryRight-click the HTMO installation folder, select Properties, then Security tab. Verify that standard users or non-admin accounts do not have Write or Modify permissions to the folderAffected if Users without administrative rights can write files to the application directory or subdirectories
You are affected if HCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook is installed with a version lower than 3.0.12 and the application directory or its load path permits unauthorized users to place files.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped3.0.12
Apply vendor-provided patches from HCL. In the interim, ensure the application directory and surrounding file system locations are protected against unauthorized file write access, and verify that only trusted, signed DLLs exist in the application's load path.
3.0.12
- Back up your existing HCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook installation and any associated data
- Download HCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook version 3.0.12 or later from the official HCL support portal (support.hcl-software.com)
- Uninstall the current version of HCL Traveler for Microsoft Outlook
- Install the downloaded version 3.0.12 or later
- Restart any running Outlook instances and Traveler services
- Verify the installed version is 3.0.12 or later
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,888.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-42190 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-42190 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data