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Improper Privilege ManagementWeakness · CWE-269

CVE-2024-43403

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-08-20
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
94/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Kanister is a data protection workflow management tool. The kanister has a deployment called default-kanister-operator, which is bound with a ClusterRole called edit via ClusterRoleBinding. The "edit" ClusterRole is one of Kubernetes default-created ClusterRole, and it has the create/patch/udpate verbs of daemonset resources, create verb of serviceaccount/token resources, and impersonate verb of serviceaccounts resources. A malicious user can leverage access the worker node which has this component to make a cluster-level privilege escalation.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Kanister operator deployment (default-kanister-operator) is bound via ClusterRoleBinding to Kubernetes' default 'edit' ClusterRole, which grants broad permissions including create/patch/update on daemonsets, create on serviceaccounts/tokens, and impersonate on serviceaccounts. A malicious user with access to a worker node running this operator can exploit these elevated permissions to perform cluster-level privilege escalation.

MitigationReplace the ClusterRoleBinding to use a custom ClusterRole with only the minimum permissions required for Kanister operator functionality, following the principle of least privilege, rather than the overly permissive 'edit' ClusterRole.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify Kanister operator is installed
    Run `kubectl get namespaces` or `kubectl get all -n kanister` to check if the kanister namespace exists and contains the operator deployment
    Affected if The kanister namespace exists with the default-kanister-operator deployment running
  2. Find the ClusterRoleBinding for Kanister
    Run `kubectl get clusterrolebindings | grep -i kanister` to list any ClusterRoleBindings with 'kanister' in the name
    Affected if A ClusterRoleBinding named something like 'kanister-operator' or containing 'kanister' exists
  3. Identify the ClusterRole referenced by the binding
    Run `kubectl get clusterrolebinding <binding-name> -o yaml` and check the 'roleRef' section to see which ClusterRole name is referenced
    Affected if The 'roleRef.name' field shows 'edit' (the default ClusterRole)
  4. Confirm the overly permissive permissions exist
    Run `kubectl get clusterrole edit -o yaml` and verify it includes create/patch/update on daemonsets, create on serviceaccounts, and impersonate on serviceaccounts (these are standard edit ClusterRole permissions)
    Affected if The bound ClusterRole is 'edit' and contains these broad permissions

The environment is affected if the kanister operator's ClusterRoleBinding references the default 'edit' ClusterRole rather than a custom minimal-permission ClusterRole.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace the ClusterRoleBinding to use a custom ClusterRole with only the minimum permissions required for Kanister operator functionality, following the principle of least privilege, rather than the overly permissive 'edit' ClusterRole.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence
  1. Identify the ClusterRoleBinding that binds the kanister-operator service account to the 'edit' ClusterRole: kubectl get clusterrolebinding -A | grep -i kanister
  2. Review the current permissions granted by the 'edit' ClusterRole to understand the full scope: kubectl get clusterrole edit -o yaml
  3. Create a custom ClusterRole with only the minimum permissions required for the kanister-operator to function properly. Base it on the actual permissions needed (daemonset create/patch/update, serviceaccount create, serviceaccount impersonate specific to kanister's namespace)
  4. Apply the new custom ClusterRole: kubectl apply -f custom-kanister-role.yaml
  5. Update the ClusterRoleBinding to reference the new custom ClusterRole instead of 'edit': kubectl get clusterrolebinding <kanister-binding-name> -o yaml > binding.yaml, edit to use new roleRef, then kubectl apply -f binding.yaml
  6. Delete or scale down any existing kanister-operator deployments that may have been running with the overly permissive binding
  7. Verify the kanister-operator functions correctly with the restricted permissions before scaling back up
  8. Audit other ClusterRoleBindings in the cluster for similar over-privileged patterns using: kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o yaml | grep -E 'clusterrolebindings|roleRef'
Caveat Changing from the 'edit' ClusterRole to a custom restrictive role may break kanister functionality if the custom role omits required permissions; thorough testing in non-production is essential

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
22.0 hours of engineering $3,800
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-43403 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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