CVE-2024-44540
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUbiquiti AirMax firmware version firmware version 8 allows attackers with physical access to gain a privileged command shell via the UART Debugging Port.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUbiquiti AirMax firmware version 8 contains a physical security vulnerability where the UART Debugging Port remains accessible, allowing an attacker with physical access to obtain a privileged command shell without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Ubiquiti AirMax devices in your environmentInventory all network devices and locate AirMax wireless equipment such as radios, stations, or access pointsAffected if AirMax devices are present in the environment
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Check AirMax firmware versionAccess the device web interface or CLI and retrieve the firmware version under the device status or system information sectionAffected if Firmware version is 8.x (version 8)
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Locate UART debug port on devicePhysically inspect the device PCB or enclosure for a header pins labeled UART, DEBUG, or CONSOLE, typically located near the main processorAffected if UART debug header pins are present and accessible on the device board
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Verify physical security of device enclosureExamine whether the device is installed in a locked cabinet, secured room, or restricted area where unauthorized physical access is preventedAffected if Device can be accessed by unauthorized personnel who could reach the UART port
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Test for debug shell access via UARTConnect a USB-to-serial adapter to the UART pins (typically 115200 baud, 8N1) and attempt to interact with the boot console or get a shell prompt without authenticationAffected if Debug shell or privileged console is accessible without authentication over UART
You are affected if you run AirMax firmware version 8 and have Ubiquiti AirMax devices where the UART debugging port is physically accessible without adequate access controls.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement physical security controls to restrict access to device UART ports (locked enclosures, restricted facility access), or contact Ubiquiti for firmware update addressing debug port hardening.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-44540 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-44540 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data