CVE-2024-4503
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability classified as critical was found in Ruijie RG-UAC up to 20240428. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /view/dhcp/dhcpConfig/dhcp_relay_commit.php. The manipulation of the argument interface_from leads to os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-263107. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceOS command injection vulnerability in Ruijie RG-UAC Unified Access Control allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the interface_from parameter in the dhcp_relay_commit.php file. The lack of input sanitization in the DHCP relay configuration functionality enables attackers to inject shell commands that are executed with web server privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify device modelAccess the device web interface or CLI and check the system information or model number. Look for RG-UAC 6000 series identifiers (CC, E10, E10c, E20, E20c, E20m, E50, E50c).Affected if The device is any Ruijie RG-UAC 6000 series model (CC, E10, E10c, E20, E20c, E20m, E50, or E50c).
-
Verify firmware versionCheck the device firmware version through the web UI (typically under System > Device Info or System > License) or via CLI command 'show version'.Affected if The device runs any firmware version on the RG-UAC 6000 series - all versions of the listed models are affected.
-
Confirm DHCP relay is configuredAccess the web interface and navigate to Network Settings > DHCP Relay or similar path. Check if DHCP relay feature is enabled and configured with an interface_from parameter.Affected if DHCP relay functionality is enabled and the interface_from parameter is present in the configuration.
-
Check web interface accessibilityVerify if the Ruijie RG-UAC web management interface (typically ports 443 or 8080) is accessible from network segments. Review firewall or ACL rules controlling access to the device management IP.Affected if The web management interface is exposed to untrusted networks or the internet.
-
Inspect DHCP relay configuration fileLocate and examine the dhcp_relay_commit.php file on the device filesystem (typically under /www or /webui directory). Check for unsanitized use of the interface_from parameter in system/exec calls.Affected if The dhcp_relay_commit.php file exists and processes the interface_from parameter without input sanitization.
You are affected if you are running any Ruijie RG-UAC 6000 series model (CC, E10, E10c, E20, E20c, E20m, E50, or E50c) with the DHCP relay feature enabled and the web management interface exposed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince the vendor has not responded to disclosures, organizations should immediately restrict access to the affected management interface from untrusted networks, deploy WAF rules to detect and block command injection patterns in the interface_from parameter, and consider network segmentation or alternative solutions while awaiting an official patch.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,968.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-4503 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-4503 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data