CVE-2024-45165
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in UCI IDOL 2 (aka uciIDOL or IDOL2) through 2.12. Data is sent between client and server with encryption. However, the key is derived from the string "(c)2007 UCI Software GmbH B.Boll" (without quotes). The key is both static and hardcoded. With access to messages, this results in message decryption and encryption by an attacker. Thus, it enables passive and active man-in-the-middle attacks.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUCI IDOL 2 through version 2.12 uses a hardcoded static encryption key derived from the string '(c)2007 UCI Software GmbH B.Boll'. Since this key is both static and discoverable (embedded in the binary), any attacker with network access can decrypt intercepted communications and re-encrypt malicious messages, enabling both passive decryption and active man-in-the-middle attacks.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify UCI Idol2 installationSearch for UCI Idol2 in your installed programs list, or check common installation directories such as C:\Program Files\UCI or /opt/uci for Linux systems.Affected if UCI Idol2 software is present on the system
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Determine installed versionLocate the Idol2 executable or application and check its version property, typically accessible via right-click > Properties > Details, or by running 'idol2 --version' if a command-line interface is available.Affected if The reported version is 2.12 or lower
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Inspect binary for hardcoded key stringOpen the Idol2 binary or associated DLL files in a hex editor or use a string search utility (e.g., 'strings' on Linux, or search within the executable) and look for the literal string '(c)2007 UCI Software GmbH B.Boll'.Affected if The string '(c)2007 UCI Software GmbH B.Boll' is found embedded within the binary files
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Check for custom key configurationExamine configuration files or registry entries for Idol2 to see if a custom encryption key has been specified, looking for parameters related to encryption key, secret key, or credential encryption.Affected if No custom key is configured and the default static key appears to be in use
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Verify network communication encryptionIf possible, capture and inspect network traffic between Idol2 clients and servers to determine if the hardcoded key can successfully decrypt the communication stream.Affected if Communications can be decrypted using the known hardcoded key derivation
If UCI Idol2 version 2.12 or earlier is installed and uses the default static encryption key, the environment is vulnerable to decryption and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the hardcoded key with a dynamic key exchange mechanism (e.g., TLS, Diffie-Hellman key exchange) and implement proper cryptographic key management to ensure each session uses unique keys.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-45165 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-45165 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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