CVE-2024-45304
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCairo-Contracts are OpenZeppelin Contracts written in Cairo for Starknet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized ownership transfer, contrary to the original owner's intention of leaving the contract without an owner. It introduces a security risk where an unintended party (pending owner) can gain control of the contract after the original owner has renounced ownership. This could also be used by a malicious owner to simulate leaving a contract without an owner, to later regain ownership by previously having proposed himself as a pending owner. This issue has been addressed in release version 0.16.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisA detailed technical summary for this CVE is being prepared.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 0.16.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped0.16.0
0.16.0
- 1. Identify all deployed instances of Cairo-Contracts versions prior to 0.16.0 in your Starknet environment
- 2. Review the changelog or release notes for version 0.16.0 to understand any changes in API or behavior
- 3. Update your dependency management (e.g., Scarb, or whatever package manager is used) to reference version 0.16.0 or later
- 4. Rebuild and retest your contracts that depend on the OpenZeppelin Cairo contracts
- 5. Deploy the upgraded contracts to replace the vulnerable instances
- 6. Verify that ownership renouncement now correctly removes both owner and pending owner roles
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-45304 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-45304 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data