CVE-2024-45413
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe HTTPD binary in multiple ZTE routers has a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in rsa_decrypt function. This function is an API wrapper for LUA to decrypt RSA encrypted ciphertext, the decrypted data is stored on the stack without checking its length. An authenticated attacker can get RCE as root by exploiting this vulnerability.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in the rsa_decrypt function of the HTTPD binary in multiple ZTE routers. The function, which serves as a LUA API wrapper for RSA decryption, stores decrypted data on the stack without validating the output length, allowing an authenticated attacker to achieve root-level RCE.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the ZTE router model and firmware versionAccess the router's web interface or check the administrative console for the device model number and firmware version under 'System Info' or 'Device Status'. Alternatively, use SNMP or check the startup banner of the HTTPD service.Affected if The device is a ZTE router model known to contain the HTTPD binary with the vulnerable rsa_decrypt function, and the firmware version falls within the unpatched range.
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Verify the HTTPD management interface is network-accessibleAttempt to reach the router's web interface on common ports (80/443) from a non-local network segment. Check firewall rules or NAT configurations that may expose the management interface externally.Affected if The HTTPD service listening on the management port is reachable from an untrusted network, increasing attack surface.
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Confirm the rsa_decrypt LUA API endpoint existsProbe the router for LUA API endpoints by accessing paths such as /cgi-bin/ or similar administrative paths and look for RSA decryption-related API functions. Review any accessible API documentation or intercept HTTP requests during normal administrative use.Affected if The rsa_decrypt LUA API wrapper function is exposed and accessible without additional hardening.
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Verify authentication is enforced on the management interfaceAttempt to access the router's management pages or API endpoints without providing valid credentials. Observe whether the device returns an authentication prompt, redirects to a login page, or denies access.Affected if The management interface or specific API endpoints do not require valid authentication, allowing an attacker to reach the vulnerable function.
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Check for signs of exploitation or anomalous behaviorReview router logs, especially those from the HTTPD binary, for unexpected RSA decryption operations, buffer overflow indicators, or unexpected process execution. Monitor for new user accounts or unexpected changes to the device configuration.Affected if Logs show unauthorized RSA decryption calls, stack corruption errors, or indicators that the vulnerability has been exploited.
The environment is affected if the device is a ZTE router running a firmware version containing the vulnerable rsa_decrypt function in the HTTPD binary, the management interface is accessible to the attacker, and the attacker can authenticate to reach the vulnerable API endpoint.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied firmware patches when available; in the interim, restrict access to the affected management interface and implement network segmentation to limit exposure.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-45413 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-45413 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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