CVE-2024-45746
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in Trusted Firmware-M through 2.1.0. User provided (and controlled) mailbox messages contain a pointer to a list of input arguments (in_vec) and output arguments (out_vec). These list pointers are never validated. Each argument list contains a buffer pointer and a buffer length field. After a PSA call, the length of the output arguments behind the unchecked pointer is updated in mailbox_direct_reply, regardless of the call result. This allows an attacker to write anywhere in the secure firmware, which can be used to take over the control flow, leading to remote code execution (RCE).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceTrusted Firmware-M's mailbox handling lacks validation of user-provided pointers for input (in_vec) and output (out_vec) argument lists. The mailbox_direct_reply function writes output lengths to arbitrary memory locations via these unchecked pointers after PSA calls, enabling an attacker to corrupt secure firmware memory, hijack control flow, and achieve remote code execution in the trusted execution environment.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Trusted Firmware-M versionLocate the TF-M version identifier in the firmware build artifacts, typically found in a version header file or build configuration file. Common locations include version.c, version.h, or the manifest file. Compare the version number to the affected range (through 2.1.0).Affected if The installed TF-M version is 2.1.0 or earlier (any version up to and including 2.1.0).
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Verify PSA mailbox feature is enabledExamine the TF-M build configuration (such as the configuration header files or Kconfig/CMake settings) for the PSA mailbox feature flag. Look for options like TF_MPSA_MAILBOX, PSA_MAILBOX, or similar configurations that enable the PSA messaging interface.Affected if The PSA mailbox feature is enabled in the build configuration.
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Confirm mailbox_direct_reply function is presentInspect the compiled firmware binary or source code for the mailbox_direct_reply function symbol. In the source, this would be in the PSA mailbox handling module. In a binary, use nm, objdump, or similar tools to locate the function.Affected if The mailbox_direct_reply function exists in the deployed firmware.
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Check for unchecked pointer handling in mailbox codeReview the mailbox implementation source code (specifically in the PSA mailbox handling files) for the mailbox_direct_reply function and verify whether in_vec and out_vec pointers are validated before being dereferenced. Look for pointer validation routines that check address bounds before memory writes.Affected if The mailbox_direct_reply function directly uses in_vec/out_vec pointers without rigorous validation, or the code lacks explicit pointer validation checks.
A system is affected if it runs any version of Trusted Firmware-M up to 2.1.0 with the PSA mailbox feature enabled and contains the vulnerable mailbox_direct_reply function with unchecked pointer handling.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the vendor patch for TF-M 2.1.0+ that adds pointer validation in mailbox_direct_reply to ensure in_vec/out_vec pointers reference valid memory within the secure partition before dereferencing, and verify the fix does not introduce side-channel leakage.
2.2.0 or later
- 1. Identify the current version of Trusted Firmware-M in use by checking the version.h or release notes in the firmware repository
- 2. Upgrade Trusted Firmware-M to version 2.2.0 or later, as this version addresses the buffer overflow vulnerability in mailbox_direct_reply
- 3. After upgrading, verify the fix is applied by reviewing the commit history for CVE-2024-45746 or checking the security advisories
- 4. Rebuild and redeploy the firmware to all affected devices
- 5. Validate the PSA workflow functions correctly with the updated firmware
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-45746 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-45746 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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