Vigor3910 FirmwareOperating system · Draytek

CVE-2024-46580

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-09-18
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Draytek Vigor 3910 v4.3.2.6 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the fid parameter at v2x00.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted input.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the v2x00.cgi web interface component of Draytek Vigor 3910 firmware version 4.3.2.6. The vulnerability is triggered via the 'fid' parameter, allowing attackers to send crafted input that overflows a buffer, resulting in Denial of Service. This is a classic input validation failure in the web application's CGI handler.

MitigationApply the vendor-supplied firmware patch when available. As an interim measure, restrict access to the web management interface to trusted IP addresses only using firewall rules or ACLs.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Vigor3910 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 4.3.2.6

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the device model
    Access the router web interface or use SNMP/SSH to confirm the device is a Draytek Vigor 3910. Check the device status page or model identification.
    Affected if The device is not a Draytek Vigor 3910 - not affected. If it is a Vigor 3910, proceed to next step.
  2. Check installed firmware version
    Log into the router web interface and navigate to System Status or Device Info to view the firmware version. Alternatively, check via command line or the firmware upgrade page.
    Affected if Firmware version is exactly 4.3.2.6 - this is the vulnerable version. Versions before or after may have fixes.
  3. Confirm v2x00.cgi is present
    Access the web interface and attempt to reach the v2x00.cgi endpoint. The exact path may be relative to the management interface (for example: https://<router-ip>/cgi/v2x00.cgi or similar). Check if the CGI script responds.
    Affected if The v2x00.cgi endpoint exists and responds on the device - the vulnerable component is present.
  4. Assess network exposure of web management interface
    Review firewall rules, port forwards, or ACLs to determine if the router web management interface (typically ports 80/443) is accessible from untrusted networks or the internet.
    Affected if The web interface is exposed to untrusted networks - the attack surface is present for exploitation.

You are affected if you are running Draytek Vigor 3910 firmware version 4.3.2.6 and the v2x00.cgi component with the fid parameter is accessible to untrusted users.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply the vendor-supplied firmware patch when available. As an interim measure, restrict access to the web management interface to trusted IP addresses only using firewall rules or ACLs.

Fix this in Vigor3910 Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,900
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-46580 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data