CVE-2024-47258
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · unedited2N Access Commander version 2.1 and prior is vulnerable in default settings to Man In The Middle attack due to not verifying certificates of 2N edge devices. 2N has currently released an updated version 3.3 of 2N Access Commander, with added Certificate Fingerprint Verification. Since version 2.2 of 2N Access Commander (released in February 2022) it is also possible to enforce TLS certificate validation.It is recommended that all customers update 2N Access Commander to the latest version and use one of two mentioned practices.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidence2N Access Commander versions 2.1 and prior do not verify TLS certificates from connected 2N edge devices in their default configuration, allowing an attacker positioned on the network to intercept and modify communications between the Access Commander server and edge devices via a Man-In-The-Middle attack.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed 2N Access Commander versionAccess the web administration interface and navigate to the About or System Information page, or check the version displayed on the login screen. Alternatively, check any installed software inventory or documentation.Affected if The displayed version is 2.1 or any version prior to 2.1
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Verify whether TLS certificate validation is enabledIn the web administration interface, locate the TLS or security settings section. Look for options related to certificate verification, certificate fingerprint validation, or TLS authentication for edge device connections.Affected if Certificate validation is disabled, not configured, or set to 'optional' in the current configuration
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Confirm the default configuration stateReview the current security configuration to determine if the installation has ever had TLS certificate validation explicitly enabled, or if it has always operated with default settings.Affected if The system is using default settings with no explicit TLS certificate validation configured for edge device communications
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Check the connected edge device configurationIn the device management or edge device settings section, verify whether the server is configured to validate certificates or fingerprints from connected 2N edge devices.Affected if The server does not require or verify TLS certificates from edge devices before establishing connections
The environment is affected if 2N Access Commander version 2.1 or prior is in use with default settings where TLS certificate validation for edge devices is disabled or not enforced.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 3.3 or later which includes Certificate Fingerprint Verification, or at minimum upgrade to version 2.2 and enable TLS certificate validation enforcement.
2N Access Commander version 3.3
- Download 2N Access Commander version 3.3 from the official 2N website (www.2n.com)
- Follow the 2N upgrade documentation to upgrade from version 2.1 or prior to version 3.3
- After upgrading to version 3.3, enable Certificate Fingerprint Verification in the settings
- Alternatively, if staying on version 2.2 or later, enforce TLS certificate validation in the configuration settings
- Verify that certificate validation is active by testing connectivity to 2N edge devices
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-47258 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-47258 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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