CVE-2024-47549
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSharp and Toshiba Tec MFPs improperly process query parameters in HTTP requests, which may allow contamination of unintended data to HTTP response headers. Accessing a crafted URL which points to an affected product may cause malicious script executed on the web browser.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceSharp and Toshiba Tec Multi-Function Printers (MFPs) contain a header injection vulnerability where query parameters in HTTP requests are not properly validated, allowing an attacker to inject malicious data into HTTP response headers. This contamination can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) when a user visits a crafted URL pointing to the affected device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= t1.01.h4.00<= t1.01.h4.00<= t2.12.h3.00all versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the MFP modelAccess the device web interface or check the physical label to confirm the exact model number (e.g., Toshiba Tec E Studio1058, Sharp BP 90c70)Affected if The model matches any of the following: Toshibatec E Studio1058, E Studio1208, E Studio908, Sharp BP 90c70, BP 90c80, BP 70c65, BP 70c55, or BP 70c45
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Check the firmware versionLog into the MFP web management interface and navigate to the System or Device Information page to view the installed firmware version. For Toshiba Tec models, look for version information in the settings or about sectionAffected if For Toshiba Tec E Studio1058 or 1208: firmware version is t1.01.h4.00 or lower. For E Studio908: firmware version is t2.12.h3.00 or lower. For Sharp BP models: any firmware version (listed as all versions)
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Confirm web management interface is enabledAttempt to access the MFP by entering its IP address in a web browser (http://[device-ip]). Verify the login page or device status page loadsAffected if The web interface is accessible on the network (this is required for the HTTP header injection to be exploitable)
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Verify remote access configurationCheck the MFP network settings to determine if remote web access is enabled. Look for options like Web Remote Access, Remote UI, or Web Based Management that allow external HTTP connectionsAffected if Remote web access is enabled and the device is reachable from untrusted networks (increases exposure to the header injection flaw)
The environment is affected if the MFP is one of the listed Sharp or Toshiba Tec models with a vulnerable firmware version and has its web management interface accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor-supplied firmware updates for affected MFP models when available. If patches are unavailable, restrict network access to MFP web management interfaces and disable remote web access.
Contact vendor for specific fixed firmware version (for E Studio1058/1208: firmware > t1.01.h4.00; for E Studio908: firmware > t2.12.h3.00; for Bp series: latest available firmware)
- 1. Identify the exact model number and current firmware version of your MFP device
- 2. Consult the vendor's official support website (global.sharp for Sharp Bp series, jvn.jp or Toshiba Tec for E Studio series) for firmware update availability
- 3. Download the latest firmware update from the vendor's official support portal
- 4. Follow the vendor's documented firmware update procedure, which typically involves accessing the device's web interface or using vendor-specific update tools
- 5. After updating, verify the new firmware version matches the fixed release
- 6. Test that the web interface functions normally and the vulnerability is no longer exploitable
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-47549 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-47549 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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