CVE-2024-47943
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe firmware upgrade function in the admin web interface of the Rittal IoT Interface & CMC III Processing Unit devices checks if the patch files are signed before executing the containing run.sh script. The signing process is kind of an HMAC with a long string as key which is hard-coded in the firmware and is freely available for download. This allows crafting malicious "signed" .patch files in order to compromise the device and execute arbitrary code.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe firmware upgrade function in Rittal IoT Interface & CMC III Processing Unit devices performs signature verification on .patch files before executing the contained run.sh script. However, the HMAC signing key is hard-coded in the firmware and is publicly available in the downloadable firmware image, allowing attackers to craft maliciously 'signed' patch files and achieve arbitrary code execution on affected devices.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLog into the device web interface or check the physical device label for the model number. Look for 'Rittal IoT Interface' or 'CMC III Processing Unit' in the device identification section.Affected if The device is a Rittal IoT Interface or CMC III Processing Unit
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Determine the firmware versionIn the device web interface, navigate to System > Firmware or Status > Information to find the installed firmware version number.Affected if The firmware version is unknown or prior to the patched version
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Check if the admin web interface is network-accessibleAttempt to access the device web management interface via its IP address on ports 80 or 443 from an external network location.Affected if The admin web interface is reachable from untrusted networks
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Verify if remote firmware upgrade is enabledIn the web interface, go to Administration > Firmware Upgrade or Settings > Update and check if the upgrade function is enabled and accessible.Affected if The firmware upgrade feature is enabled and accessible to attackers
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Inspect firmware upgrade configurationCheck the firmware upgrade settings page for any indication that .patch file uploads are accepted and whether signature verification is actually being performed.Affected if The device accepts .patch files for upgrades without additional authentication beyond admin login
You are affected if you have a Rittal IoT Interface or CMC III Processing Unit device with the firmware upgrade feature accessible, as the hardcoded HMAC key allows attackers to bypass signature verification on malicious patch files.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemediate by updating to a firmware version that implements proper cryptographic code signing with a secure key management infrastructure, or implement network-level controls to restrict access to the admin web interface until a patch is available.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation40.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-47943 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-47943 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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