CVE-2024-50692
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSunGrow WiNet-SV200.001.00.P027 and earlier versions contains hardcoded MQTT credentials that allow an attacker to send arbitrary commands to an arbitrary inverter. It is also possible to impersonate the broker, because TLS is not used to identify the real MQTT broker. This means that MQTT communications are vulnerable to MitM attacks at the TCP/IP level.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe SunGrow WiNet-SV200.001.00.P027 and earlier firmware contains hardcoded MQTT credentials that allow authenticated attackers to send arbitrary commands to any inverter connected to the system. Additionally, MQTT communications lack TLS encryption, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks where attackers can impersonate the broker and intercept or manipulate commands in transit.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 200.001.00.p027< 200.001.00.p027CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed firmware versionAccess the WiNet-S management interface or check the device firmware information. Compare the version number to the affected range: version 200.001.00.p027 or any earlier version.Affected if The installed firmware version is 200.001.00.p027 or lower.
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Verify if MQTT service is configured and activeCheck the device configuration or network services list to determine if MQTT messaging is enabled for inverter communication.Affected if MQTT is enabled and used for communicating with inverters.
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Inspect MQTT configuration for credentialsExamine the MQTT broker configuration or firmware files for stored credentials. Look for hardcoded username/password values in the configuration.Affected if Hardcoded credentials are found in the MQTT configuration.
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Check MQTT transport security settingsInspect the MQTT connection settings to determine whether TLS/SSL encryption is enabled for broker communications.Affected if TLS encryption is not enabled for MQTT communications (connections use unencrypted transport).
A user is affected if their device runs firmware version 200.001.00.p027 or earlier AND has MQTT enabled with hardcoded credentials and no TLS encryption.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data200.001.00.p027
Replace hardcoded MQTT credentials with dynamically generated, unique credentials per deployment and implement TLS encryption for all MQTT communications. As an interim control, network segmentation should be applied to isolate the inverter management network.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,928.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-50692 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-50692 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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