CVE-2024-52397
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in Davor Zeljkovic Convert Docx2post convert-docx2post allows Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server.This issue affects Convert Docx2post: from n/a through <= 1.4.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe convert-docx2post application lacks proper file type validation on its upload function, allowing attackers to upload executable files such as web shells. This unrestricted upload capability enables remote code execution on the affected server.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify convert-docx2post installationSearch for convert-docx2post in your application inventory, running services, or installed packages. Check web server document roots for any application directories containing 'convert-docx2post', 'docx2post', or similar naming patterns.Affected if The application is present in your environment and the upload feature is accessible.
-
Determine the installed versionLocate the application's version file, about page, or check the binary/package version using the package manager or file properties. Compare against any publicly disclosed affected version ranges.Affected if The version is within an affected range or cannot be determined (unknown versions should be treated as potentially affected).
-
Verify if the upload endpoint is exposedReview application routing configuration, web server logs, or API documentation for upload-related endpoints (e.g., /upload, /file/upload, /convert). Attempt a benign request to the suspected upload endpoint if authorized.Affected if The upload endpoint is accessible over the network without authentication or with weak access controls.
-
Inspect current file validation configurationExamine the application's configuration files, source code, or upload handler for file type validation logic. Look for allowlists, magic byte checks, or Content-Type validation before file processing.Affected if No file type validation is implemented, or validation relies solely on file extension or Content-Type header without content inspection.
-
Check upload directory accessibilityIdentify where uploaded files are stored. Determine if the upload directory is web-accessible and if script execution permissions are disabled in that location.Affected if Uploaded files are stored in a web-accessible directory where executable scripts (PHP, JSP, ASPX, etc.) can be invoked.
Your environment is affected if convert-docx2post is running with an accessible upload endpoint that lacks proper file type validation and stores files in a web-accessible location with script execution enabled.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict file type validation using allowlists, store uploads outside the web root, disable script execution in upload directories, and validate file content (magic bytes) in addition to extension checks.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-52397 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-52397 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data