CVE-2024-5321
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn Kubernetes clusters with Windows worker nodes, container log files are stored with overly permissive NTFS access controls. The BUILTIN\Users group has read permissions, allowing any local user to view container logs (potential information disclosure), while NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users has modify permissions, allowing any domain-authenticated user to alter or delete log entries (potential log tampering).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Windows worker node presence in the clusterRun 'kubectl get nodes -o wide' and check for Windows nodes, or inspect node metadata with 'kubectl get nodes <node-name> -o jsonpath={.status.nodeInfo.osImage}' to verify Windows OSAffected if The environment contains Windows worker nodes joined to a Kubernetes cluster
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Locate container log directory on Windows nodesOn the Windows node, check the default Kubernetes container log path, typically at 'C:\var\log\pods\' (or the path configured via --log-dir in kubelet)Affected if Container log directories exist on the Windows node
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Check NTFS permissions on pod log filesOpen PowerShell as Administrator and run 'Get-Acl -Path 'C:\var\log\pods\*' -Recurse | Select-Object Path, AccessToString' or use 'icacls C:\var\log\pods\* /T' to list all access control entriesAffected if BUILTIN\Users or NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users appear in the permission output for any log file or folder
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Verify specific vulnerable permissions existRun 'icacls C:\var\log\pods\* /T | findstr /i "Users.Authenticated"' to filter for the specific problematic groups. Check for '(R)' (read) after BUILTIN\Users or '(F)' (full) / (M) (modify) after NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersAffected if BUILTIN\Users shows (R) read permission OR NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users shows (M) modify or (F) full control on any container log files
The environment is affected if running Windows worker nodes in Kubernetes with container logs accessible to BUILTIN\Users (read) or NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users (modify) beyond the container runtime and admin accounts.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict NTFS permissions on Kubernetes container log directories on Windows nodes to only allow the container runtime and appropriate administrative/service accounts access. Use icacls or Group Policy to remove BUILTIN\Users read access and NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users modify access.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-5321 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-5321 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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