CVE-2024-53931
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe com.glitter.caller.screen (aka iCaller, Caller Theme & Dialer) application through 1.1 for Android enables any application (with no permissions) to place phone calls without user interaction by sending a crafted intent via the com.glitter.caller.screen.DialerActivity component.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe iCaller Android application through version 1.1 exposes the com.glitter.caller.screen.DialerActivity component without proper access controls, allowing any installed application to send crafted intents that trigger outgoing phone calls without user interaction or elevated permissions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm iCaller app is installedRun 'adb shell pm list packages | grep icaller' or 'adb shell pm list packages | grep glitter' to check if the iCaller app exists on the deviceAffected if The package name containing 'icaller' or 'glitter.caller.screen' is found in the installed packages
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Identify the installed versionRun 'adb shell dumpsys package <package_name>' and look for versionName/versionCode, or use 'adb shell pm dump <package_name> | grep -i version'Affected if The installed version is 1.1 or any version lower than 1.1 (the fixed version is not specified)
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Extract and inspect the AndroidManifest.xmlObtain the APK (via 'adb pull /data/app/<package>/base.apk') and run 'aapt dump badging <apk> | grep -i activity' to list exported components, or use an APK analysis tool to decompile and inspect AndroidManifest.xml directlyAffected if The com.glitter.caller.screen.DialerActivity component is present and shows android:exported='true' or has no android:exported attribute set (defaults to true)
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Verify component access controlsIn the decompiled AndroidManifest.xml, check the <activity> tag for DialerActivity: look for android:exported='false' or android:permission attribute with a custom permissionAffected if The DialerActivity has no android:permission attribute AND android:exported is not set to false, meaning any app can send intents to trigger calls
You are affected if the iCaller Android app version 1.1 or lower is installed AND the DialerActivity component is exported without permission protection, allowing other apps to trigger outgoing calls without user interaction.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable or properly protect the DialerActivity component by setting android:exported='false' or adding android:permission checks; implement user confirmation dialogs before placing any calls originated from intents.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-53931 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-53931 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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