Incorrect AuthorizationWeakness · CWE-863

CVE-2024-53941

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-12-02
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
93/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
An issue was discovered in Victure RX1800 WiFi 6 Router (software EN_V1.0.0_r12_110933, hardware 1.0) devices. A remote attacker (in proximity to a Wi-Fi network) can derive the default Wi-Fi PSK value via the last 4 octets of the BSSID.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Victure RX1800 WiFi 6 Router ships with a default PSK that can be mathematically derived by knowing the last 4 octets of the BSSID (access point MAC address). An attacker in Wi-Fi range can discover the BSSID via standard network discovery and then calculate the PSK, gaining unauthorized network access.

MitigationImmediately change the default Wi-Fi PSK to a strong, unique value through the router admin interface. Check for and apply any firmware updates from Victure. Consider using WPA3 if supported, or at minimum ensure the new PSK is not derived from any predictable network identifiers.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Adjacent
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the router model
    Check the device label or admin interface for the exact model number. Common ways: look for 'Victure RX1800' on the physical device, or access the router admin panel (typically 192.168.0.1 or 192.168.1.1) and check the device info page.
    Affected if The device is NOT a Victure RX1800 WiFi 6 Router.
  2. Obtain the BSSID of the WiFi network
    Use a WiFi scanning tool (such as 'iwlist', 'netsh wlan show interfaces' on Windows, or a mobile WiFi analyzer app) to capture the BSSID (access point MAC address) of the wireless network broadcast by this router.
    Affected if You cannot retrieve a BSSID because the router is not broadcasting a WiFi network.
  3. Check if the PSK matches the default value
    Access the router admin interface and navigate to the wireless security settings. Compare the current Pre-Shared Key (PSK) against any default PSK documented on the router label or in the quick start guide. Alternatively, if you never changed the PSK since setup, the current PSK is the default.
    Affected if The PSK has never been changed from the factory default and can be derived from the BSSID.
  4. Verify PSK is not derived from BSSID
    If you set a custom PSK, confirm it does not contain portions of the BSSID (the last 4 octets of the MAC address) or follow any predictable pattern. Check if the PSK appears random and unrelated to the MAC address.
    Affected if The PSK contains recognizable fragments of the BSSID or follows a predictable derivation pattern.

You are affected if you are using a Victure RX1800 WiFi 6 Router and have not changed the default PSK from the factory setting, as the default PSK can be calculated using the BSSID.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Immediately change the default Wi-Fi PSK to a strong, unique value through the router admin interface. Check for and apply any firmware updates from Victure. Consider using WPA3 if supported, or at minimum ensure the new PSK is not derived from any predictable network identifiers.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
7.0 hours of engineering $1,240
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-53941 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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