CVE-2024-55656
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRedisBloom adds a set of probabilistic data structures to Redis. There is an integer overflow vulnerability in RedisBloom, which is a module used in Redis. The integer overflow vulnerability allows an attacker (a redis client which knows the password) to allocate memory in the heap lesser than the required memory due to wraparound. Then read and write can be performed beyond this allocated memory, leading to info leak and OOB write. The integer overflow is in CMS.INITBYDIM command, which initialize a Count-Min Sketch to dimensions specified by user. It accepts two values (width and depth) and uses them to allocate memory in NewCMSketch(). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.19, 2.4.12, 2.6.14, and 2.8.2.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceInteger overflow in RedisBloom's CMS.INITBYDIM command allows authenticated Redis clients to cause undersized heap allocation via width/depth parameter wraparound, leading to out-of-bounds read/write and potential information disclosure.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm RedisBloom module is loadedRun the command 'MODULE LIST' in redis-cli to see if the bloom module is present. Look for module name containing 'bloom' or 'cms'.Affected if The bloom module appears in the output, indicating RedisBloom is active.
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Identify RedisBloom versionRun 'MODULE INFO' with the bloom module name (e.g., 'MODULE INFO bloom' or 'MODULE INFO cms') to retrieve the module version.Affected if The version is 2.2.18 or earlier, 2.4.11 or earlier, 2.6.13 or earlier, or 2.8.1 or earlier.
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Verify CMS command availabilityRun 'COMMAND INFO CMS.INITBYDIM' to confirm the command is exposed by the module.Affected if The command returns information showing CMS.INITBYDIM is available.
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Confirm authentication is requiredReview Redis configuration (redis.conf) for 'requirepass' setting and verify that unauthenticated connections are rejected by attempting a connection without credentials.Affected if No password is set or authentication is disabled, meaning unauthenticated clients can execute CMS.INITBYDIM.
A system is affected if RedisBloom is loaded, the version is within the vulnerable ranges, and clients (even if authenticated) can execute the CMS.INITBYDIM command with large width/depth parameters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade RedisBloom to version 2.2.19, 2.4.12, 2.6.14, or 2.8.2 or later. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict Redis access to trusted clients only since valid authentication credentials are required for exploitation.
RedisBloom 2.2.19, 2.4.12, 2.6.14, or 2.8.2 (choose the version appropriate for your Redis release)
- Identify the currently installed RedisBloom module version using `MODULE LIST` or checking your module load configuration
- Determine which RedisBloom release series you are using (2.2.x, 2.4.x, 2.6.x, or 2.8.x)
- Download the appropriate fixed version from the RedisBloom GitHub releases: 2.2.19, 2.4.12, 2.6.14, or 2.8.2
- Stop the Redis server gracefully using `redis-cli SHUTDOWN NOSAVE` or `systemctl stop redis`
- Replace the old RedisBloom module file with the new version
- Update the Redis configuration file (redis.conf) to load the new module version if explicitly specified
- Start the Redis server
- Verify the module is loaded with correct version using `MODULE LIST`
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-55656 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-55656 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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