CVE-2024-56518
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHazelcast Management Center through 6.0 allows remote code execution via a JndiLoginModule user.provider.url in a hazelcast-client XML document (aka a client configuration file), which can be uploaded at the /cluster-connections URI.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHazelcast Management Center through version 6.0 contains a critical remote code execution vulnerability where attackers can upload a malicious hazelcast-client XML configuration file via the /cluster-connections URI. The XML contains a crafted JndiLoginModule with a malicious user.provider.url parameter that enables JNDI injection, allowing the attacker to trigger arbitrary code execution by causing the server to perform a JNDI lookup to an attacker-controlled LDAP or RMI endpoint.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 6.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Hazelcast Management Center versionCheck the deployed Management Center version. This is typically visible in the UI footer, or via the /api/version endpoint, or by inspecting the deployed WAR/JAR file name or manifest.Affected if The installed version is 6.0 or any version lower than 6.0.
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Verify /cluster-connections endpoint exposureDetermine if the Management Center is exposed to untrusted networks. Check network ACLs, firewall rules, or reverse proxy configurations to see if the /cluster-connections URI path is reachable from outside the trusted network.Affected if The /cluster-connections endpoint is accessible from untrusted or public networks without authentication restrictions.
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Inspect uploaded configuration filesSearch the Management Center data directory for any uploaded hazelcast-client.xml files. Common locations include the config directory or user-uploaded directories. Review any such files for suspicious JndiLoginModule entries, particularly any user.provider.url pointing to ldap:// or rmi:// URLs.Affected if A hazelcast-client.xml file exists with a JndiLoginModule containing a remote LDAP/RMI provider URL.
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Check JVM JNDI security settingsIf you have access to the JVM arguments or system properties running Management Center, verify whether com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase is set to false. This property can be checked in the startup scripts, Kubernetes deployment YAML, or by querying JMX if available.Affected if The JVM is running with com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase not set to false (or not set at all), meaning JNDI remote class loading is not explicitly disabled.
A user is affected if their Management Center version is 6.0 or lower, the /cluster-connections endpoint is exposed to untrusted networks, and JNDI protections are not in place.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Hazelcast Management Center to a version beyond 6.0 that patches this vulnerability, and if immediate patching is not possible, restrict or disable the /cluster-connections upload functionality and disable JNDI lookups in the JndiLoginModule configuration.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-56518 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-56518 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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