CVE-2024-57811
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn Eaton X303 3.5.16 - X303 3.5.17 Build 712, an attacker with network access to a XC-303 PLC can login as root over SSH. The root password is hardcoded in the firmware. NOTE: This vulnerability appears in versions that are no longer supported by Eaton.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Eaton X303 PLC firmware contains a hardcoded root password that allows an attacker with network access to authenticate as root over SSH. This gives full administrative control of the PLC.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the PLC modelLog into the PLC's web interface or check the device labeling/management console to confirm the exact model number is Eaton X303Affected if The device is an Eaton X303 PLC
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Check if SSH service is enabledAccess the PLC's web-based management interface and navigate to the services or network settings section to verify whether SSH (port 22) is enabledAffected if SSH is enabled and accessible on the PLC
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Determine the firmware versionIn the PLC's web interface or through the management console, locate the firmware version information. Compare this against any known affected version ranges or note if the firmware is outdated/end-of-lifeAffected if The firmware version is outdated or within an affected end-of-life release line
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Verify SSH network exposureFrom a host on the same network, attempt to reach port 22 on the PLC's IP address (e.g., using telnet, nc, or nmap), or check firewall rules governing access to the PLCAffected if Port 22/SSH is reachable from any network segment beyond the immediate control plane
You are affected if you have an Eaton X303 PLC with SSH enabled and accessible, regardless of whether the hardcoded credential is currently in use.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedSince the affected versions are end-of-life and receive no vendor patches, mitigate by isolating the device on a restricted network segment, blocking SSH access from untrusted networks via firewall rules, and replacing with a supported device where possible.
- 1. Disable SSH access on the XC-303 PLC if not required for operations
- 2. Implement network segmentation to isolate the PLC from untrusted networks
- 3. Configure firewall rules to restrict access to the PLC to only authorized IP addresses
- 4. If SSH is required, implement network-level access controls such as VPN or jump host access
- 5. Monitor SSH authentication logs for brute force attempts
- 6. Consider replacing the affected device with a currently supported model if SSH access is essential
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-57811 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-57811 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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