CVE-2024-58352
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedLandray OA contains an unauthenticated HQL injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to query arbitrary Hibernate entity classes by injecting malicious HQL syntax into the uid POST parameter of the wechatLoginHelper.do endpoint. Attackers can exploit the lack of input sanitization in the string-concatenated filter expression passed to the Hibernate findList() call to extract sensitive data such as administrator password hashes and, with sufficient database privileges, perform file-write operations enabling remote code execution. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2024-03-11 (UTC).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceLandray OA contains an unauthenticated HQL injection in the wechatLoginHelper.do endpoint. The uid POST parameter is directly concatenated into an HQL filter expression passed to Hibernate's findList() method without input sanitization, allowing attackers to inject malicious HQL syntax to query arbitrary entity classes, extract sensitive data such as administrator password hashes, and potentially achieve remote code execution via file-write operations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Landray OA installationIdentify the application by checking the web banner, login page source code, or common installation paths for Landray OA files (such as WeChatLoginHelper.class or related Java archives in the deployment directory)Affected if The system is running Landray OA software
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Determine Landray OA versionLocate the version identifier in typical Landray OA locations: the about page, version info in login JSP files, config XML files in the WEB-INF directory, or server banner informationAffected if The installed version falls within any known affected range or cannot be determined (treat as potentially affected)
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Verify wechat module is enabledCheck for the presence and enabled status of the wechat module configuration - look for wechat-related XML configuration files, the wechatLoginHelper.class file in the compiled classes, or wechat feature flags in the application's configurationAffected if The wechat module or wechatLoginHelper component is present and enabled in the deployment
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Check endpoint accessibilityVerify the vulnerable endpoint exists by attempting to access or enumerate /wechatLoginHelper.do (or the equivalent path in the specific Landray OA deployment)Affected if The wechatLoginHelper.do endpoint is accessible without authentication
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Confirm HQL injection point existenceReview the deployed wechatLoginHelper.do component's source code or decompiled class files to verify the uid parameter is passed directly to Hibernate's findList() method without parameterized bindingAffected if The uid parameter handling uses direct string concatenation into HQL queries rather than parameterized queries
The environment is affected if it runs Landray OA with the wechat module enabled where the wechatLoginHelper.do endpoint handles the uid parameter via direct HQL concatenation rather than parameterized queries.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor patches immediately if available; if no patch exists, implement strict input validation and parameterized queries for the uid parameter, restrict network access to the affected endpoint, and review Hibernate query patterns throughout the application for similar injection flaws.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-58352 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-58352 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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