CVE-2024-7457
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe ws.stash.app.mac.daemon.helper tool contains a vulnerability caused by an incorrect use of macOS’s authorization model. Instead of validating the client's authorization reference, the helper invokes AuthorizationCopyRights() using its own privileged context (root), effectively authorizing itself rather than the client. As a result, it grants the system.preferences.admin right internally, regardless of the requesting client's privileges. This flawed logic allows unprivileged clients to invoke privileged operations via XPC, including unauthorized changes to system-wide network preferences such as SOCKS, HTTP, and HTTPS proxy settings. The absence of proper code-signing checks further enables arbitrary processes to exploit this flaw, leading to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks through traffic redirection.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe ws.stash.app macOS helper tool incorrectly uses macOS authorization by invoking AuthorizationCopyRights() with its own root context instead of validating the client's authorization reference. This allows unprivileged clients to invoke privileged XPC operations and modify system-wide network proxy settings (SOCKS, HTTP, HTTPS), enabling MITM attacks. The lack of code-signing validation further enables arbitrary processes to exploit this flaw.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if ws.stash.app is installedSearch for the application in common locations: /Applications/, ~/Applications/, or run 'ls -la /Applications/ | grep -i stash' and 'mdfind kMDItemCFBundleIdentifier | grep -i stash'Affected if The application bundle with identifier containing 'stash' or 'ws.stash' is found in the system
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Determine the installed ws.stash.app versionRun 'defaults read /Applications/ws.stash.app/Contents/Info.plist CFBundleShortVersionString' or right-click the app in Finder and select Get Info to view the version numberAffected if The version number matches or predates any known vulnerable version (compare against published patch versions when available)
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Locate and inspect the helper tool binaryCheck for the helper tool at paths like '/Library/Application Support/ws.stash.app/' or inside the app bundle at 'Contents/Library/LaunchServices/' and inspect its permissions with 'ls -la <path>'Affected if A helper tool binary exists with elevated privileges (root ownership, setuid bit, or sudo permissions)
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Verify code signing status of the helperRun 'codesign -dv /path/to/helper.tool' to check if the helper is properly signed, and compare the signing certificate against the main applicationAffected if The helper tool is not code-signed, has an invalid signature, or the signature does not match the main application certificate
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Check for unauthorized proxy configuration changesInspect system proxy settings via System Preferences > Network > Advanced > Proxies, or run 'scutil --proxy' and review any SOCKS/HTTP/HTTPS proxy configurations you did not intentionally setAffected if Proxy settings show unexpected or unauthorized configurations pointing to unknown servers
If ws.stash.app is installed and its helper tool exists with elevated privileges but lacks proper code-signing validation, the environment is likely vulnerable to CVE-2024-7457.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataFix the helper to properly validate client authorization references rather than authorizing itself, and implement code-signing verification to ensure only legitimate clients can invoke privileged operations.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-7457 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-7457 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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