CVE-2025-10016
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Sparkle framework includes a helper tool Autoupdate. Due to lack of authentication of connecting clients a local unprivileged attacker can request installation of crafted malicious PKG file by racing to connect to the daemon when other app spawns it as root. This results in local privilege escalation to root privileges. It is worth noting that it is possible to spawn Autopudate manually via Installer XPC service. However this requires the victim to enter credentials upon system authorization dialog creation that can be modified by the attacker. This issue was fixed in version 2.7.2
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Sparkle framework's Autoupdate helper tool lacks authentication on its XPC connection, allowing a local unprivileged attacker to race and connect to the daemon when spawned as root. The attacker can then request installation of a crafted malicious PKG file, achieving local privilege escalation to root.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify applications using the Sparkle frameworkSearch for applications that bundle the Sparkle framework in their Contents/Frameworks directory: find /Applications -name 'Sparkle.framework' -type d 2>/dev/nullAffected if Any Sparkle.framework is found in an application bundle
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Determine the installed Sparkle versionFor each found Sparkle.framework, read the Info.plist and check CFBundleShortVersionString, or run: otool -L /path/to/Sparkle.framework/Sparkle | grep -i versionAffected if The version is lower than 2.7.2 or cannot be determined (treat as vulnerable)
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Check for autoupdate helper tool activityMonitor for running 'sparkle' or 'org.sparkle-project.Autoupdate' processes, or examine system logs: log show --predicate 'process contains[cd] "autoupdate"' --last 24hAffected if The autoupdate helper tool has been recently spawned or is currently running with elevated privileges
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Audit for recent PKG installation attemptsReview installer logs and receipt databases for unusual PKG installations, especially those initiated by the autoupdate helper: grep -r 'PKG' /var/log/install* 2>/dev/null || ls -la /var/db/receipts/ | head -20Affected if Any PKG installations were triggered through the autoupdate mechanism that you did not initiate manually
You are affected if any application on your system bundles a Sparkle framework version earlier than 2.7.2, and the autoupdate helper tool has been recently active on the system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate Sparkle framework to version 2.7.2 or later, which includes proper XPC client authentication. Verify that the Autoupdate helper tool now validates connecting clients before processing installation requests.
Sparkle framework version 2.7.2
- Identify all applications or projects that utilize the Sparkle framework
- For each affected application, check the bundled Sparkle framework version or the Sparkle dependency version in the project (e.g., via CocoaPods, Swift Package Manager, or Carthage)
- Upgrade the Sparkle framework dependency to version 2.7.2 or later
- Rebuild and redistribute the affected applications with the updated framework
- Verify that the Autoupdate helper tool now properly authenticates connecting clients before accepting installation requests
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-10016 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-10016 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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