CVE-2025-13526
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe OneClick Chat to Order plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.8 via the 'wa_order_thank_you_override' function due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to view sensitive customer information including names, email addresses, phone numbers, billing/shipping addresses, order contents, and payment methods by simply changing the order ID in the URL.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe OneClick Chat to Order WordPress plugin has an IDOR vulnerability in the wa_order_thank_you_override function. The plugin fails to validate or authorize order IDs supplied in the URL, allowing any unauthenticated visitor to access sensitive customer order data by simply modifying the order ID parameter.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify plugin is installed and get versionIn WordPress admin, go to Plugins > Installed Plugins and locate 'OneClick Chat to Order', or check the plugin main file header for Version comment, or query the database: SELECT option_value FROM wp_options WHERE option_name = 'active_plugins' and check plugin folder for version in readme.txt or main PHP fileAffected if Plugin is installed and version is below 1.0.9
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Identify vulnerable endpoint exposureCheck if the wa_order_thank_you_override function is accessible by examining plugin PHP files (typically in /wp-content/plugins/oneclick-chat-to-order/) and identifying the hooked action/filter (often a page endpoint or query var like 'wa-order-thank-you' or 'order_id' parameter)Affected if The plugin routes handle order ID parameters via URL without explicit authorization checks in the code
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Test unauthenticated order ID manipulationUsing a browser or curl, visit the suspected thank-you page URL (commonly patterns like ?page=wa-order-thank-you&order_id=1 or similar) with different order ID values while NOT logged in, and check if order details are returnedAffected if Order data is returned for arbitrary order IDs without requiring login or order ownership verification
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Verify missing authorization logicReview the wa_order_thank_you_override function in the plugin source code for presence of current_user_can(), wp_verify_nonce(), or order ownership validation checks before outputting order dataAffected if No authorization or ownership validation exists before order data is displayed
User is affected if the OneClick Chat to Order plugin version is below 1.0.9 AND the order thank-you page endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users with order data being returned for manipulated order IDs.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate to version 1.0.9 or later which adds proper authorization checks. Until then, consider disabling the plugin or implementing web application firewall rules to block manipulation of order-related URL parameters.
1.0.9 (or latest available version)
- Log in to the WordPress admin dashboard
- Navigate to Plugins > Installed Plugins
- Find the OneClick Chat to Order plugin
- Click 'Update now' if an update is available, or manually download the latest version from wordpress.org and upload it
- After updating, verify the plugin is running version 1.0.9 or higher
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-13526 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-13526 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data