CVE-2025-1385
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedWhen the library bridge feature is enabled, the clickhouse-library-bridge exposes an HTTP API on localhost. This allows clickhouse-server to dynamically load a library from a specified path and execute it in an isolated process. Combined with the ClickHouse table engine functionality that permits file uploads to specific directories, a misconfigured server can be exploited by an attacker with privilege to access to both table engines to execute arbitrary code on the ClickHouse server. You can check if your ClickHouse server is vulnerable to this vulnerability by inspecting the configuration file and confirming if the following setting is enabled: <library_bridge> <port>9019</port> </library_bridge>
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceClickHouse's library_bridge feature exposes an HTTP API on localhost (port 9019) that allows dynamic library loading into isolated processes. When combined with table engines that permit file uploads to specific directories, an attacker with access to both features can upload a malicious library and execute arbitrary code by instructing the library bridge to load it.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- High
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify ClickHouse versionRun `clickhouse-server --version` or check the installed package version with your package manager (e.g., `dpkg -l clickhouse-server`, `rpm -qi clickhouse-server`)Affected if Version is within the affected range (older, unpatched versions)
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Locate ClickHouse configuration fileFind the active config.xml, typically at /etc/clickhouse-server/config.xml or /etc/clickhouse/config.xml. Check ClickHouse logs for the config path on startup.Affected if Config file exists and contains library_bridge settings
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Check if library_bridge is enabledExamine the config.xml for an uncommented <library_bridge> section. Search for `grep -i library_bridge /etc/clickhouse-server/config.xml`Affected if The <library_bridge> element is present and not disabled (not commented out or set to enabled="0")
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Verify library_bridge is listeningRun `netstat -tlnp | grep 9019` or `ss -tlnp | grep 9019` to check if port 9019 is open and bound to localhostAffected if Port 9019 is listening on localhost, indicating library_bridge HTTP API is active
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Identify accessible table engines that allow file uploadsReview user permissions and roles in config.xml or via `SELECT * FROM system.users` and `SELECT * FROM system.roles`. Check for grants on table functions or engines that write to filesystem (e.g., file(),url(),s3() with write access, or engine types that accept file paths). Query `SELECT * FROM system.table_functions` to see available functions.Affected if Untrusted users or roles have permissions to use table functions or engines that allow uploading/writing files to specific directories
User is affected if running a vulnerable ClickHouse version with library_bridge enabled AND untrusted users have access to both the library_bridge API and table engines/functions that permit file uploads to directories.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable the library_bridge configuration in clickhouse-server config.xml by removing or commenting out the <library_bridge> section, and restrict access to table engines that allow file uploads to trusted users only.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-1385 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-1385 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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