CVE-2025-14817
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe component com.transsion.tranfacmode.entrance.main.MainActivity in com.transsion.tranfacmode has no permission control and can be accessed by third-party apps which can construct intents to directly open adb debugging functionality without user interaction.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe MainActivity component in Transsion's tranfacmode app lacks exported=false or permission controls in its AndroidManifest.xml declaration, allowing any installed third-party app to send intents that launch the activity. This activity, when launched via intent, enables ADB debugging functionality without requiring user interaction or authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 14.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if tranfacmode app is installedUse a package manager to list installed packages and search for 'tranfacmode' - on Android use 'pm list packages | grep tranfacmode' or check app settingsAffected if The tranfacmode package exists on the device
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Extract AndroidManifest.xml from tranfacmodeUse 'adb shell pm path com.transsion.tranfacmode' to find the APK, then pull and parse AndroidManifest.xml or use 'aapt dump badging [apk_path]' to inspect the MainActivity declarationAffected if The AndroidManifest.xml shows MainActivity with no android:exported='false' attribute and no android:permission attribute defined
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Verify exported attribute on MainActivityInspect the <activity> tag for MainActivity in the manifest - check if android:exported is absent or set to trueAffected if android:exported is not set to false or is explicitly set to true
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Check for permission requirement on MainActivityInspect the <activity> tag for android:permission attribute - verify if a signature-level or dangerous permission is requiredAffected if No android:permission attribute is present on the MainActivity declaration
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Test ADB debugging behaviorSend an intent to the MainActivity from a separate app or via adb shell am start -n com.transsion.tranfacmode/.MainActivity and observe if ADB debugging settings become enabled without user promptsAffected if ADB debugging enables automatically after the intent without requiring user interaction or authentication
The device is affected if the tranfacmode app is present with MainActivity lacking android:exported='false' and any permission protection, allowing unauthorized apps to trigger ADB debugging.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAdd android:exported='false' or implement a signature-level permission (android:permission) on the MainActivity component in AndroidManifest.xml, and add code-level permission verification within the activity before enabling ADB debugging.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-14817 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-14817 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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