CVE-2025-15566
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-proxy-set-headers` Ingress annotation can be used to inject configuration into nginx. This can lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the ingress-nginx controller, and disclosure of Secrets accessible to the controller. (Note that in the default installation, the controller can access all Secrets cluster-wide.)
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe ingress-nginx controller's `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-proxy-set-headers` annotation allows injection of configuration into nginx, enabling arbitrary code execution in the controller's context and disclosure of cluster-wide secrets (which the controller has access to by default).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify ingress-nginx controller is deployedRun 'kubectl get pods -n ingress-nginx' or check for ingress-nginx pods in any namespace where it's installedAffected if ingress-nginx controller pods are running in the cluster
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Check ingress-nginx versionRun 'kubectl get deployment -n ingress-nginx ingress-nginx-controller -o jsonpath="{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}"' or check the image tag of the controller podAffected if the controller version is unpatched (no specific version range provided, compare to any available patched version)
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Identify Ingress resources using the vulnerable annotationRun 'kubectl get ingress --all-namespaces -o jsonpath="{range .items[?(@.metadata.annotations.\"nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-proxy-set-headers\")]}{.metadata.namespace}/{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}"' to find Ingress resources with the auth-proxy-set-headers annotationAffected if any Ingress resource uses the 'nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-proxy-set-headers' annotation with untrusted values
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Confirm the annotation contains untrusted or external valuesRun 'kubectl get ingress --all-namespaces -o json' and inspect the value of the 'nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-proxy-set-headers' annotation in each Ingress foundAffected if the annotation value references headers or configurations not controlled by the cluster administrator
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Verify controller has access to cluster secretsCheck the service account used by the ingress-nginx controller (kubectl get deployment -n ingress-nginx ingress-nginx-controller -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.serviceAccount}') and review its RBAC bindings (kubectl get clusterrolebinding -o jsonpath='{range .items[?(@.subjects[?(@.kind=="ServiceAccount")])}{.metadata.name}{" "}{end}')Affected if the controller's service account has cluster-wide secret access (default behavior grants broad permissions)
You are affected if ingress-nginx controller is deployed, any Ingress resource uses the 'nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-proxy-set-headers' annotation, and the controller has access to secrets (which is the default).
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict the ingress-nginx controller's RBAC permissions to limit secret access cluster-wide, audit and remediate any Ingress resources using this annotation with untrusted values, and consider upgrading to a patched version when available.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-15566 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-15566 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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