CVE-2025-2730
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was found in H3C Magic NX15, Magic NX30 Pro, Magic NX400, Magic R3010 and Magic BE18000 up to V100R014. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /api/wizard/getssidname of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. The manipulation leads to command injection. The attack can only be initiated within the local network. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCommand injection vulnerability in H3C Magic router firmware's HTTP POST handler for the /api/wizard/getssidname endpoint allows authenticated attackers on the local network to execute arbitrary system commands. The flaw stems from insufficient input validation before passing user-supplied data to system shell commands. Public exploit code is available, lowering the barrier for exploitation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify your H3C Magic router modelAccess the router web interface under Status or Device Info, or log in via SSH and run 'show device-info' or similar command to display the model numberAffected if Model is NX15, NX30 Pro, NX400, R3010, or BE18000
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Check the installed firmware versionIn the router web interface, go to Administration or System Settings > Firmware Version; alternatively, via SSH run 'show version' or '固件版本' commandAffected if Firmware version is V100R014 or any version at or below V100R014 (such as V100R013, V100R012, etc.)
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Verify the vulnerable endpoint is presentSend an HTTP POST request to /api/wizard/getssidname on the router (requires valid admin session cookie); a response (even an error) indicates the endpoint existsAffected if The endpoint responds, confirming the wizard API is enabled on the device
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Confirm network accessibility to management interfaceCheck if the router admin web interface (HTTP/HTTPS on ports 80/443) is reachable from the WAN interface or from untrusted network segmentsAffected if The router management interface is exposed to the WAN or to guest/untrusted network segments, allowing remote or lateral attackers to reach the API
You are affected if you have an H3C Magic router (NX15, NX30 Pro, NX400, R3010, or BE18000) running firmware V100R014 or below, with the /api/wizard endpoint accessible from the network where attackers can obtain valid authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade affected H3C Magic devices (NX15, NX30 Pro, NX400, R3010, BE18000) to a version beyond V100R014 as recommended by the vendor. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict network access to the management interface and disable the wizard API endpoints.
Latest firmware version beyond V100R014 from H3C official support
- 1. Identify the exact H3C Magic model (NX15, NX30 Pro, NX400, R3010, or BE18000) currently in use
- 2. Access the router's web management interface or console
- 3. Navigate to the firmware update or system settings section
- 4. Download the latest firmware version from the official H3C support website (www.h3c.com or zhiliao.h3c.com)
- 5. Upload and apply the firmware update, following H3C's official upgrade instructions
- 6. Verify the firmware version has been updated beyond V100R014 after reboot
- 7. Confirm the /api/wizard/getssidname endpoint no longer accepts unauthenticated or unsafe input
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-2730 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-2730 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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