CVE-2025-29756
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSunGrow's back end users system iSolarCloud https://isolarcloud.com uses an MQTT service to transport data from the user's connected devices to the user's web browser. The MQTT server however did not have sufficient restrictions in place to limit the topics that a user could subscribe to. While the data that is transmitted through the MQTT server is encrypted and the credentials for the MQTT server are obtained though an API call, the credentials could be used to subscribe to any topic and the encryption key can be used to decrypt all messages received. An attack with an account on iSolarCloud.com could extract MQTT credentials and the decryption key from the browser and then use an external program to subscribe to the topic '#' and thus recieve all messages from all connected devices.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSunGrow's iSolarCloud MQTT service lacked topic-based access controls, allowing authenticated users to extract MQTT credentials and decryption keys from the browser and subscribe to the '#' wildcard topic, thereby intercepting all device communications across the entire platform.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- Authentication
- Y
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if iSolarCloud MQTT service is runningCheck for processes or services named iSolarCloud, mqtt, or running on typical MQTT ports (1883, 8883). Use commands like 'ps aux | grep -i solar' or 'netstat -anp | grep mqtt' to locate the service.Affected if The iSolarCloud MQTT service is present and running in the environment.
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Inspect MQTT broker ACL configurationExamine the MQTT broker configuration files (e.g., mosquitto.conf, ACL files) for presence and enforcement of topic access control lists. Look for 'acl_file' or 'pattern' directives that restrict user-level topic subscriptions.Affected if No ACL configuration exists or the broker allows unrestricted wildcard subscriptions.
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Test if '#' wildcard topic is accessibleUsing an authenticated MQTT client (such as mosquitto_sub or an MQTT explorer tool), attempt to subscribe to the '#' topic with standard user credentials. If the subscription succeeds without error, wildcard access is permitted.Affected if The subscription to '#' topic succeeds and returns messages from other users or devices.
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Check for client-side credential exposureInspect web browser developer tools (Network/Fission tabs) when using the iSolarCloud web interface. Look for MQTT broker URLs, usernames, passwords, or decryption keys appearing in API responses, JavaScript files, or WebSocket connections.Affected if Valid MQTT credentials, broker endpoints, or encryption keys are visible in client-side code or responses.
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Verify user isolation on MQTT topicsSubscribe to a topic belonging to a different user account (e.g., 'device/+/telemetry' or user-specific paths). Compare whether messages from other user accounts are accessible.Affected if Messages from other users' devices are reachable with a standard authenticated account.
A user is affected if the iSolarCloud MQTT service is running and allows unrestricted '#' wildcard subscriptions or exposes credentials client-side, enabling cross-user data interception.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement MQTT topic ACLs to restrict users to only their authorized device topics, and review credential/key handling to prevent extraction of valid credentials from the client-side.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $15,616.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-29756 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-29756 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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