CVE-2025-30057
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn UHCRTFDoc, the filename parameter can be exploited to execute arbitrary code via command injection into the system() call in the ConvertToPDF function.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceCommand injection vulnerability in UHCRTFDoc's ConvertToPDF function allows arbitrary code execution via the filename parameter being passed unsanitized to a system() call.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate UHCRTFDoc installationSearch for UHCRTFDoc files in common installation directories (e.g., /opt/, /usr/local/, or project dependencies). Check for assemblies or DLLs named UHCRTFDoc.dll or similar. If a .NET project, inspect the referenced packages in the project file (.csproj) or packages.config for UHCRTFDoc.Affected if UHCRTFDoc library is present in the environment or project dependencies
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Identify UHCRTFDoc versionCheck the version of the UHCRTFDoc DLL/assembly by right-clicking the file and selecting Properties > Details, or use a tool like dotPeek/ILSpy to inspect the assembly version attribute. If using a package manager (NuGet), run 'dotnet list package' or check the .csproj file for the version number.Affected if The installed version cannot be compared to a patched version (no version range provided, but newer versions should be verified)
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Verify ConvertToPDF function usageSearch codebases for calls to ConvertToPDF method. Use grep or IDE search for 'ConvertToPDF' to find all invocations. Inspect the call sites to see how the filename parameter is being passed.Affected if Code calls ConvertToPDF and passes a user-controlled or external filename value to it
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Inspect filename parameter handlingAt the ConvertToPDF call site, examine what value is passed as the filename argument. Trace the data flow: is it from user input (request parameters, CLI arguments, file uploads), external APIs, or hardcoded values?Affected if The filename argument originates from untrusted input without validation
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Check for unsafe system call usageIf source code is available, decompile or inspect the UHCRTFDoc ConvertToPDF method to confirm it invokes system() or equivalent shell execution. Look for Process.Start, ShellExecute, or runtime.exec calls using the filename.Affected if The ConvertToPDF implementation uses system() or similar shell execution with unsanitized input
If UHCRTFDoc is present, ConvertToPDF is called with a filename derived from untrusted input, and the implementation uses shell execution without sanitization, the environment is vulnerable to CVE-2025-30057.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation and sanitization on the filename parameter before use in system() calls, or replace system() calls with safer API alternatives that do not involve shell command execution.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-30057 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-30057 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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