CVE-2025-3008
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Novastar CX40 up to 2.44.0. Affected is the function system/popen of the file /usr/nova/bin/netconfig of the component NetFilter Utility. The manipulation leads to command injection. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceCommand injection vulnerability in Novastar CX40 LED display controller's NetFilter Utility (netconfig). The vulnerable function system/popen in /usr/nova/bin/netconfig allows attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands through the component, potentially executing them with the privileges of the running service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Novastar CX40 controller on the networkLocate Novastar CX40 LED display controllers by checking network inventory, scanning for the device's typical management ports (typically TCP 10801, 52866, or HTTP on 80/8080), or reviewing hardware asset records for Novastar CX40 models.Affected if A Novastar CX40 LED display controller is present in the environment and accessible.
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Verify netconfig binary presenceIf you have shell access to the device, run: ls -la /usr/nova/bin/netconfig. This checks if the vulnerable netconfig utility exists at the known path.Affected if The file /usr/nova/bin/netconfig exists on the device.
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Confirm netconfig service is runningOn the device, check if the netconfig process is active: ps aux | grep netconfig or check if the service is listening on expected ports.Affected if The netconfig service is running and the device is network-accessible.
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Review network exposure of netconfigCheck firewall rules or network ACLs to determine if the management port for netconfig (commonly port 10801) is exposed to untrusted networks or the internet.Affected if The netconfig service port is accessible from untrusted networks without authentication barriers.
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Check for indicators of compromiseReview system logs (/var/log/nova/*.log or similar), look for unexpected shell command executions, or inspect the device for unauthorized scripts or connections that may indicate prior exploitation.Affected if Unexpected commands, new files in /usr/nova/bin/, or suspicious network connections to/from the device are found.
Your environment is affected if a Novastar CX40 controller with the netconfig utility at /usr/nova/bin/netconfig is present and network-accessible, particularly if the service port is exposed to untrusted networks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince the vendor has not responded to disclosure, implement network segmentation to isolate the device, restrict access to the netconfig utility via firewall rules, and monitor for indicators of compromise until an official firmware patch is available.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-3008 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-3008 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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