CVE-2025-30111
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOn IROAD v9 devices, one can Remotely Dump Video Footage and the Live Video Stream. The dashcam exposes endpoints that allow unauthorized users, who gained access through other means, to list and download recorded videos, as well as access live video streams without proper authentication.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe IROAD v9 dashcam firmware exposes web service endpoints for video file listing, downloading, and live streaming without requiring proper authentication. An attacker who has gained network access through other means can exploit these unauthenticated endpoints to dump all recorded video footage and view live video streams.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the device is an IROAD v9 dashcamAccess the device's web interface or check the device label/metadata to confirm the model is IROAD v9. Alternatively, inspect network traffic or device discovery responses for IROAD v9 identifiers.Affected if The device is an IROAD v9 dashcam on the network.
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Confirm the web service is exposed on the networkAttempt to access the device's IP address on common HTTP ports (typically port 80 or 8080) from an untrusted network segment. Use a browser or curl to send a request to the root URL or common endpoints like /web/ or /api/.Affected if The device responds to HTTP requests on its IP address without being blocked by firewall rules.
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Test video listing endpoint for authentication bypassSend an HTTP GET request to common video listing endpoints such as /web/recordings, /api/files, /record/list, or similar paths without providing any credentials or session tokens. Observe if the response returns a list of recorded video files.Affected if The endpoint returns video file listings or metadata without requiring any authentication.
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Test video download endpoint for authentication bypassUsing the file list or known file paths, attempt to download a video file by accessing a download endpoint (such as /download, /record/play, or /media/file) without any authentication headers or cookies.Affected if Video files can be downloaded without providing any credentials.
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Test live streaming endpoint for authentication bypassAccess common live streaming endpoints such as /live, /stream, /real-time, or /web/live without any authentication. Check if the stream begins playing or returns stream metadata.Affected if Live video stream is accessible without authentication.
The user is affected if they have an IROAD v9 dashcam on their network with web service endpoints accessible without authentication credentials.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied firmware updates when available; otherwise, restrict network access to the dashcam through firewall rules or VLAN segmentation to limit exposure to trusted users.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-30111 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-30111 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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