CVE-2025-32060
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe system suffers from the absence of a kernel module signature verification. If an attacker can execute commands on behalf of root user (due to additional vulnerabilities), then he/she is also able to load custom kernel modules to the kernel space and execute code in the kernel context. Such a flaw can lead to taking control over the entire system. First identified on Nissan Leaf ZE1 manufactured in 2020.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe system lacks kernel module signature verification, allowing an attacker with root privileges to load arbitrary unsigned kernel modules into kernel space and execute code in kernel context. This provides complete control over the system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if kernel module signature verification is compiled inInspect /boot/config-$(uname -r) or /proc/config.gz for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG setting. Look for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (enabled) or CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not set (disabled).Affected if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not set or set to =n, meaning module signature verification is not compiled into the kernel
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Check if module signature enforcement is enabledInspect the same kernel config for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE. If present and set to =y, signature verification is mandatory.Affected if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not set or set to =n, meaning loading unsigned modules is still allowed
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Check current module loading restrictions at runtimeRun 'cat /proc/sys/kernel/modules_disabled' to see if module loading is disabled (1) or enabled (0). Also check 'sysctl kernel.modules_disabled'.Affected if modules_disabled returns 0, meaning modules can still be loaded dynamically
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Check secure boot status if availableRun 'mokutil --sb-state' or check /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-* to see if secure boot is enabled.Affected if Secure boot is disabled or not available, meaning there is no firmware-level enforcement of code integrity
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Test whether an unsigned module can be loadedAttempt to load a test module or check system logs for module signature rejection messages. Review dmesg for 'module signature' or 'module verification' errors.Affected if No signature validation errors occur when loading arbitrary modules, confirming the vulnerability is exploitable
The system is affected if kernel module signature verification (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) is not enabled or enforced, allowing unsigned kernel modules to be loaded.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement kernel module signature verification (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or equivalent) and establish a secure boot chain to ensure only cryptographically signed modules from trusted sources can be loaded.
- Consultation10.0 h
- Implementation30.0 h
- Testing20.0 h
- Review / QA12.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $20,096.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-32060 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-32060 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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