CVE-2025-4382
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw was found in systems utilizing LUKS-encrypted disks with GRUB configured for TPM-based auto-decryption. When GRUB is set to automatically decrypt disks using keys stored in the TPM, it reads the decryption key into system memory. If an attacker with physical access can corrupt the underlying filesystem superblock, GRUB will fail to locate a valid filesystem and enter rescue mode. At this point, the disk is already decrypted, and the decryption key remains loaded in system memory. This scenario may allow an attacker with physical access to access the unencrypted data without any further authentication, thereby compromising data confidentiality. Furthermore, the ability to force this state through filesystem corruption also presents a data integrity concern.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceIn systems using LUKS-encrypted disks with GRUB configured for TPM-based automatic decryption, an attacker with physical access can corrupt the filesystem superblock to force GRUB into rescue mode. Since the disk auto-decrypts early in the boot process, the decryption key remains loaded in memory even after GRUB enters rescue mode, allowing access to decrypted data without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify LUKS encryption is in useRun 'lsblk -o NAME,TYPE,FSTYPE' or check 'cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdX' for each disk to confirm LUKS headerAffected if Any system disk uses LUKS encryption (TYPE='crypt' in lsblk or luksDump succeeds)
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Check GRUB configuration for TPM auto-unlockInspect /boot/grub/grub.cfg for 'tpm2' or 'unlock' keywords, or grep for TPM in /etc/default/grub and /etc/grub.d/* filesAffected if GRUB contains TPM-related automatic decryption configuration (e.g., 'tpm2-auto-unlock' or similar settings)
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Verify TPM unlock settings in crypttabCheck /etc/crypttab for entries containing 'tpm2-device' or 'tpm2-key' options indicating TPM-based key retrievalAffected if Any crypttab entry specifies TPM-based automatic unlocking (not just passphrase or keyfile)
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Confirm TPM2 hardware or firmware is presentRun 'ls /dev/tpm*' or 'tpm2_getcap handles-persistent' to detect TPM2 device availabilityAffected if TPM2 device is present and usable by the system for key storage
The system is affected if it uses LUKS encryption combined with TPM-based automatic decryption enabled in GRUB and crypttab, allowing the decryption key to remain in memory after GRUB rescue mode is triggered via filesystem corruption.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable TPM-based automatic decryption and require manual authentication (passphrase) or implement additional authentication layers before data access. Alternatively, ensure physical security to prevent filesystem corruption attacks.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-4382 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-4382 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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