CVE-2025-43989
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe /goform/formJsonAjaxReq POST endpoint of Shenzhen Tuoshi NR500-EA RG500UEAABxCOMSLICv3.4.2731.16.43 devices mishandles the set_timesetting action with the ntpserver0 parameter, which is used in a system command. By setting a username=admin cookie (bypassing normal session checks), an unauthenticated attacker can use that parameter to execute arbitrary OS commands.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCommand injection vulnerability in the /goform/formJsonAjaxReq POST endpoint of Tuoshi NR500-EA RG500UE devices. The set_timesetting action passes the ntpserver0 parameter directly to a system() call without sanitization. An unauthenticated attacker bypasses session checks using a username=admin cookie, allowing arbitrary OS command execution via the NTP server parameter.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelAccess the device's web interface or check the device label/marketing for the model name 'NR500-EA' or 'RG500UE' from Tuoshi. Alternatively, make an HTTP GET request to the device's IP and examine any login page or banner for the model string.Affected if The device is a Tuoshi NR500-EA or RG500UE unit.
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Confirm web interface is reachableFrom a remote host, attempt an HTTP or HTTPS request to the device's IP address on common ports (80, 443, 8080). Check if the login page or /goform/formJsonAjaxReq endpoint responds.Affected if The device's web interface is network-accessible from an untrusted network.
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Test for vulnerable endpoint existenceSend a POST request to /goform/formJsonAjaxReq with a JSON body containing an action field set to 'set_timesetting' and a ntpserver0 field with a benign test value (such as 'test'). Use a cookie header with 'username=admin'. Observe if the device processes the request.Affected if The endpoint responds and accepts the set_timesetting action with the ntpserver0 parameter.
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Verify command injection is possibleSend a POST to /goform/formJsonAjaxReq with action=set_timesetting and ntpserver0 set to a payload like ';echo injected' or '$(echo injected)'. Check the response or any time-related output for evidence of command execution.Affected if The ntpserver0 value is executed as an OS command, and the injected command output appears in the response or system state.
If the device is a Tuoshi NR500-EA or RG500UE and its web interface is accessible, the set_timesetting endpoint accepts unsanitized input to ntpserver0, allowing unauthenticated command injection via the username=admin cookie.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor firmware patch when available; until then, restrict network access to the device's web interface using firewall rules or place behind a VPN, as no authentication directly protects this endpoint.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-43989 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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