CVE-2025-4701
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in VITA-MLLM Freeze-Omni up to 20250421. This issue affects the function torch.load of the file models/utils.py. The manipulation of the argument path leads to deserialization. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA deserialization vulnerability exists in VITA-MLLM Freeze-Omni's models/utils.py where the torch.load function processes a manipulable path argument. This allows an attacker with local access to load malicious serialized PyTorch model files, potentially executing arbitrary code through unsafe pickle deserialization.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate VITA-MLLM or Freeze-Omni installationSearch for the project directory: find / -type d -name 'Freeze-Omni' 2>/dev/null or find / -type d -name 'VITA-MLLM' 2>/dev/null. Also check pip list for installed packages containing these names.Affected if The project is installed or present on the system
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Find the vulnerable models/utils.py fileWithin the VITA-MLLM or Freeze-Omni directory, locate models/utils.py. Use: find <project_path> -name 'utils.py' -path '*/models/*'Affected if The file models/utils.py exists in the project
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Inspect torch.load calls for unsafe deserializationOpen models/utils.py and search for torch.load calls. Check if they use torch.load(path) without the weights_only=True parameter. Example vulnerable pattern: torch.load(model_path)Affected if torch.load is called without weights_only=True parameter, enabling arbitrary code execution via pickle
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Check if model paths are user-controllableReview the code around torch.load calls to determine if the path argument comes from external input, configuration files, or user-supplied values rather than hardcoded trusted paths.Affected if The path argument to torch.load can be influenced by an attacker (e.g., from config, CLI args, or external input)
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Verify file permissions on model directoriesCheck who can write to directories containing model files: ls -la <project_path>/models/ and ls -la <project_path>/checkpoints/ or similar model storage directories.Affected if Model directories are writable by untrusted users, allowing injection of malicious model files
A user is affected if VITA-MLLM or Freeze-Omni is installed and models/utils.py contains torch.load calls without weights_only=True where the model path can be controlled by an attacker.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace unsafe torch.load calls with torch.load(weights_only=True) where feasible, implement path allowlisting, and add cryptographic signature verification for model files before loading.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-4701 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-4701 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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