CVE-2025-47730
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe TeleMessage archiving backend contains hardcoded credentials (username 'logfile' and password 'enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO') that allow unauthorized API access to request authentication tokens. An attacker with knowledge of these credentials can bypass authentication to access the archive functionality.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2025-05-05CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check TeleMessage versionLocate the installed Smarsh Telemessage application and retrieve its version number from the software itself, typically found in the About section, an installer log, or a version file within the installation directory.Affected if The installed version is 2025-05-05 or earlier.
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Locate credential storageSearch the TeleMessage installation directory for files containing the hardcoded username 'logfile' or the password string 'enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO'. Inspect configuration files, property files, or embedded strings within application binaries.Affected if Either credential string is found hardcoded in any file within the TeleMessage installation.
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Test API authentication bypassSend a POST request to the TeleMessage archive API endpoint with the hardcoded credentials (username: logfile, password: enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO) to request an authentication token. Use a tool like curl or a REST client.Affected if The API accepts these credentials and returns a valid authentication token without requiring legitimate user credentials.
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Verify archive endpoint accessibilityAttempt to access the archive functionality API endpoints using the token obtained from the hardcoded credentials. Check if sensitive archive data can be retrieved without proper user authentication.Affected if Archive data or functionality is accessible using tokens obtained via the hardcoded credentials.
A user is affected if their TeleMessage installation contains the hardcoded 'logfile' credentials or if the API accepts these credentials for authentication, and the installed version is 2025-05-05 or earlier.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the hardcoded credentials with dynamic, per-user authentication mechanisms and rotate any exposed credentials immediately. Update to a version beyond 2025-05-05 that removes these default credentials.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-47730 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-47730 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data