dbcve.org
Deserialization of Untrusted DataWeakness · CWE-502

CVE-2025-50472

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2025-08-01
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The modelscope/ms-swift library thru 2.6.1 is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution through deserialization of untrusted data within the `load_model_meta()` function of the `ModelFileSystemCache()` class. Attackers can execute arbitrary code and commands by crafting a malicious serialized `.mdl` payload, exploiting the use of `pickle.load()` on data from potentially untrusted sources. This vulnerability allows for remote code execution (RCE) by deceiving victims into loading a seemingly harmless checkpoint during a normal training process, thereby enabling attackers to execute arbitrary code on the targeted machine. Note that the payload file is a hidden file, making it difficult for the victim to detect tampering. More importantly, during the model training process, after the `.mdl` file is loaded and executes arbitrary code, the normal training process remains unaffected'meaning the user remains unaware of the arbitrary code execution.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The modelscope/ms-swift library through version 2.6.1 contains a critical arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the `load_model_meta()` function of the `ModelFileSystemCache()` class. The vulnerability stems from using `pickle.load()` to deserialize data from `.mdl` files without validation, allowing attackers to embed malicious Python objects that execute arbitrary code upon deserialization. The attack is particularly stealthy as the payload file is hidden and normal training continues unaffected.

MitigationReplace unsafe `pickle.load()` calls with safer deserialization methods (JSON, yaml, or a restricted unpickler with allowlist) and implement cryptographic integrity verification for `.mdl` files before loading.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check installed ms-swift version
    Run `pip show ms-swift` or `pip list | grep ms-swift` to see the installed version
    Affected if Version is 2.6.1 or lower (including any version with '2.' prefix before 2.6.2)
  2. Locate ModelFileSystemCache usage in code
    Search for `ModelFileSystemCache` in your codebase: `grep -r 'ModelFileSystemCache' .` or inspect import statements for `from swift import ModelFileSystemCache`
    Affected if The ModelFileSystemCache class is imported and instantiated in your code
  3. Identify .mdl file loading operations
    Search for `.mdl` file loading patterns: `grep -r '\.mdl' .` and look for file read operations handling these cache files
    Affected if Your code loads or processes .mdl files from cache directories
  4. Verify pickle deserialization in load_model_meta
    Inspect the ms-swift library source for pickle.load usage: find the swift package location (pip show ms-swift | grep Location) then grep for 'pickle.load' in the ModelFileSystemCache module
    Affected if pickle.load() is used to deserialize .mdl files without signature verification or allowlist filtering

You are affected if ms-swift version is 2.6.1 or lower AND your environment uses ModelFileSystemCache to load .mdl files using unsafe pickle.load() calls.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace unsafe `pickle.load()` calls with safer deserialization methods (JSON, yaml, or a restricted unpickler with allowlist) and implement cryptographic integrity verification for `.mdl` files before loading.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing10.0 h
  • Review / QA6.0 h
34.0 hours of engineering $5,940
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $9,504.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-50472 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-50472 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data