CVE-2025-52365
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA command injection vulnerability in the szc script of the ccurtsinger/stabilizer repository allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via unsanitized user input passed to os.system(). The vulnerability arises from improper input handling where command-line arguments are directly concatenated into shell commands without validation
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA command injection vulnerability exists in the szc script within the ccurtsinger/stabilizer repository. The vulnerability stems from unsanitized user input being directly concatenated into shell commands passed to os.system(), allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary system commands by injecting shell metacharacters via command-line arguments.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Locate the szc script in your environmentSearch for files named 'szc' in common binary/script directories (e.g., /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, ~/bin) or within any stabilizer package installations using 'find / -name szc 2>/dev/null' or 'which szc'Affected if The szc script from the ccurtsinger/stabilizer repository is found on the system
-
Identify os.system() calls in the scriptExamine the szc script content using 'cat <path_to_szc>' and search for lines containing 'os.system'Affected if The script contains os.system() calls that could accept external input
-
Check if command-line arguments reach os.system() unsanitizedSearch the script for patterns where sys.argv, argparse values, or other user input variables are passed directly into os.system() calls without validation (e.g., look for 'os.system' near argument parsing code)Affected if User-supplied command-line arguments are concatenated directly into shell commands passed to os.system()
-
Verify the stabilizer package versionIf stabilizer is installed as a Python package, run 'pip show stabilizer' or check the installed version against any available version information from the repositoryAffected if The installed version of stabilizer predates the security fix for this command injection vulnerability
-
Test for command injection susceptibilityRun the szc script with a test argument containing shell metacharacters (e.g., '; echo test' or '$(whoami)') passed to any argument that flows into os.system() - examine if the injected command executesAffected if Shell metacharacters in arguments are executed by the script, confirming the injection vulnerability is present
A user is affected if the szc script from ccurtsinger/stabilizer is installed and uses os.system() with direct concatenation of command-line arguments without input sanitization.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace os.system() calls with subprocess module using shell=False and pass arguments as a list, or implement strict input validation/sanitization before using any shell execution method.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-52365 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-52365 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data