CVE-2025-52545
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedE3 Site Supervisor Control (firmware version < 2.31F01) RCI service contains an API call to read users info, which returns all usernames and password hashes for the application services.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceE3 Site Supervisor Control firmware before 2.31F01 contains an unauthenticated API endpoint in the RCI service that returns all usernames and their corresponding password hashes when queried, enabling attackers to obtain credentials for offline cracking or direct authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2.31f01CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm E3 Site Supervisor productIdentify if the target device is a Copeland E3 Supervisory Controller by checking the device model, web interface, or system documentationAffected if Device is not a Copeland E3 Supervisory Controller
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Retrieve firmware versionAccess the device web interface, check system information page, or use SNMP/CLI commands to obtain the currently installed firmware versionAffected if Firmware version is below 2.31F01 (for example, 2.30 or earlier)
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Locate RCI serviceIdentify if the RCI (Remote Controller Interface) service is running on the device by scanning common ports (typically 8080, 8888, or vendor-specific ports) or checking service documentationAffected if RCI service is enabled and accessible on the network
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Verify unauthenticated endpoint exposureIf RCI is accessible, attempt to access the API endpoint without authentication. Common test paths include /api/users, /rci/users, or /users endpoint. Send an HTTP GET request without providing credentials and observe if the response contains username and hash dataAffected if Endpoint returns username and password hash data without requiring authentication
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Check network accessibility of RCIDetermine if the RCI service is exposed to untrusted networks by reviewing firewall rules, ACLs, or network segmentation configurations surrounding the deviceAffected if RCI service is reachable from an untrusted or external network segment
Device is affected if it is a Copeland E3 Supervisory Controller running firmware version earlier than 2.31F01 with the RCI service accessible over the network without proper authentication restrictions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped2.31f01
Upgrade firmware to version 2.31F01 or later to remediate. Until patched, restrict network access to the RCI service and monitor for suspicious queries.
E3 Supervisory Controller Firmware 2.31f01
- 1. Backup current firmware configuration following the manufacturer's backup procedures
- 2. Download the E3 Supervisory Controller Firmware version 2.31f01 or later from the official vendor source
- 3. Access the E3 Supervisory Controller web interface or management console
- 4. Navigate to the Firmware Update or System Maintenance section
- 5. Upload the downloaded firmware file (2.31f01)
- 6. Initiate the firmware upgrade process and wait for completion
- 7. Verify the firmware version has been updated to 2.31f01 or later
- 8. Confirm the RCI service API no longer returns password hashes in user info responses
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-52545 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-52545 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data