CVE-2025-5491
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAcer ControlCenter contains Remote Code Execution vulnerability. The program exposes a Windows Named Pipe that uses a custom protocol to invoke internal functions. However, this Named Pipe is misconfigured, allowing remote users with low privileges to interact with it and access its features. One such feature enables the execution of arbitrary programs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM. By leveraging this, remote attackers can execute arbitrary code on the target system with elevated privileges.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAcer ControlCenter exposes a Windows Named Pipe with a custom protocol for invoking internal functions. The named pipe is misconfigured, permitting low-privilege remote users to connect and interact with its features. One exposed function allows execution of arbitrary programs with NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM privileges, enabling remote attackers to achieve privilege escalation and execute arbitrary code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Acer ControlCenter installationCheck for Acer ControlCenter in the Windows Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall or look in Program Files for Acer\ControlCenter folder, or query Get-WmiObject Win32_Product for 'Acer ControlCenter'Affected if The software is installed and running on the system
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Identify installed versionRight-click the ControlCenter executable (typically in C:\Program Files\Acer\ControlCenter or C:\Program Files (x86)\Acer\ControlCenter), select Properties, and note the File Version under the Details tab; alternatively query the registry key for DisplayVersionAffected if Version cannot be determined or falls within any unpatched release range
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Verify Named Pipe presence and accessibilityOpen PowerShell and run Get-ChildItem \\.\pipe\ | Where-Object {$_.Name -like '*Acer*' -or $_.Name -like '*ControlCenter*'} to list Acer-related Named Pipes, then use Get-Acl \\.\pipe\<pipe_name> to inspect the security descriptor (ACL)Affected if An Acer-related Named Pipe exists and permits access from low-privilege or remote users (check for Everyone, Users, or Authenticated Users with Allow permissions)
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Check Named Pipe ACL configurationUse a tool like PipeList from Sysinternals (pipelist /acls) or inspect the security descriptor programmatically with PowerShell [System.Security.AccessControl.NativeObjectSecurity]::new() to determine if non-admin accounts can connectAffected if The ACL grants connect permissions to less-privileged accounts or anonymous users, allowing remote low-privilege interaction
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Validate network exposureReview Windows Firewall rules for inbound rules allowing SMB or RPC access to the host, and check for any listening ports associated with ControlCenter using netstat -an | findstr LISTENING or PowerShell Get-NetTCPConnection -State ListenAffected if The system is reachable over the network and the Named Pipe service accepts remote procedure calls without proper authentication restrictions
A user is affected if Acer ControlCenter is installed and its Named Pipe is accessible to low-privilege or remote users, allowing unauthorized SYSTEM-privilege code execution.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor patches from Acer for ControlCenter when available. As an interim measure, restrict network access to systems running Acer ControlCenter and monitor for suspicious processes spawning from the service account.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-5491 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-5491 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data