CVE-2025-54962
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · unedited/edit-user in webserver in OpenPLC Runtime 3 through 9cd8f1b allows authenticated users to upload arbitrary files (such as .html or .svg), and these are then publicly accessible under the /static URI.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe /edit-user endpoint in OpenPLC Runtime 3 allows authenticated users to upload arbitrary file types including .html and .svg files. These uploaded files are then served publicly under the /static URI path, enabling stored XSS attacks via malicious HTML or SVG files accessible to all users.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm OpenPLC Runtime 3 is installedIdentify the OpenPLC Runtime installation on the system. This is typically a web-based SCADA runtime environment. Check for the service running on common ports (8080, 8090) or inspect installed packages. Look for the OpenPLC web interface or service process.Affected if OpenPLC Runtime version 3 is installed on the system.
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Verify the /edit-user endpoint existsAccess the OpenPLC Runtime web interface and attempt to navigate to /edit-user or check if this endpoint is available in the application's routing. As an authenticated user, confirm the endpoint accepts requests.Affected if The /edit-user endpoint is present and accessible to authenticated users.
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Inspect file upload functionalityLog in as an authenticated user and access the /edit-user endpoint. Examine the form or API to determine what file types can be uploaded. Attempt to upload test files with .html and .svg extensions to verify if arbitrary file types are accepted.Affected if The upload functionality accepts .html or .svg file types without strict validation.
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Check if uploads are served under /staticAfter uploading a file, verify the response includes a path or URL pointing to the /static URI path. Attempt to access the uploaded file via the web using the /static path to confirm it is publicly accessible.Affected if Uploaded files are accessible via the /static URI path and served to all users.
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Compare installed version to affected rangeCheck the OpenPLC Runtime version by accessing the web interface footer, checking the service version, or inspecting installed package metadata. OpenPLC Runtime 3 is the affected product line.Affected if The installed version is OpenPLC Runtime 3.
A user is affected if OpenPLC Runtime 3 is installed, the /edit-user endpoint accepts file uploads, and uploaded files including .html or .svg are served publicly under the /static path.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict allowlist-based file type validation at the application layer (checking magic bytes/content-type), store uploads outside the webroot or in a non-public location, and serve uploaded content with restrictive Content-Type headers to prevent script execution.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-54962 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-54962 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data